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NOTES
THE FINAL REGULATIONS UNDER IRC SECTIONS
704(b) AND 752: ENVISIONING ECONOMIC RISK OF
LOSS THROUGH A GLASS DARKLY
I. INTRODUCTION
When a partnership borrows money and spends the proceeds on a
deductible expenditure, which partners may deduct the partnership expense?
When a sole proprietor' borrows one hundred dollars to pay wages to an
employee, the Internal Revenue Code (IRC) allows the sole proprietor a
deduction for compensation expense. 2 Allowance of the deduction makes
sense because the sole proprietor made the wage payment and will have to
forfeit his personal assets to the extent he defaults on his one hundred
dollar loan. Thus, the sole proprietor taxpayer bears the economic cost of
the payment that gives rise to the deduction. Similarly, if a corporation
borrows one hundred dollars to pay wages to an employee, the IRC allows
the corporation a deduction for compensation expense. 4 Again, this makes
sense because the corporation made the payment, and the creditor can attach
the corporation's assets, rather than the assets of its shareholders, if the
corporation fails to repay its one hundred dollar loan.5 Thus, the corporate
taxpayer bears the economic cost of the payment that gives rise to the
deduction. If a partnership6 borrows one hundred dollars to pay wages,
1. See BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 1392 (6th ed. 1990) (defining sole proprietorship as
form of business in which one person owns all assets in contrast to partnership, trust or
corporation). BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY also states, "The sole proprietor is soley liable for all
the debts of the business." Id. at 1392.
2. I.R.C. § 162(a)(1) (1988). Section 162(a)(1) allows a deduction for "all the ordinary
and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year in carrying on a trade or
business, including-a reasonable allowance for salaries or other compensation for personal
services actually rendered." Id.
3. See BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 340 (6th ed. 1990) (defining corporation as artificial
person or legal entity created by or under authority of state law). BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY
also provides, "The law treats the corporation as a person which can sue and be sued." Id.
at 340.
4. See supra note 2 and accompanying text (allowing deduction for salary expense).
5. See MODEL Busa;Ess Corn'. ACT § 6.22(b) (1985) (providing limited liability for
corporate shareholders). The text of § 6.22(b) provides, "Unless otherwise provided in the
articles of incorporation, a shareholder of a corporation is not personally liable for the acts
or debt of the corporation . . . ." Id. Thus, creditors of a corporation generally must look
only to the corporation and not to the shareholders for payment of liabilities. Id.
6. See BLAcK's LAW DICTIONARY 1120 (6th ed. 1990) (defining partnership as business
owned by two or more persons and not organized as corporation). The UNIoRM PARTNERsHP
WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 49:487
however, two problems arise. First, because the partners, and not the
partnership, pay tax on partnership income,7 the partnership must determine
which partners should receive allocations of the compensation expense.8
Second, because the creditor can reach through the partnership and attach
some of the partners' personal assets if the partnership does not repay its
one hundred dollar loan,9 general partners may actually bear the economic
cost of the one hundred dollar payment while limited partners, if any, may
not.'0 In order to be consistent with the sole proprietor and corporate
scenarios, the partnership should allocate the deduction to the partner
taxpayers that bear the economic cost of generating the deduction."
Until recently, consistency in deducting losses between partnerships and
other business forms did not exist. Partnerships enjoyed extensive flexibility
in allocating items of income and loss among partners, and only limited
guidance existed regarding the determination of which partners could include
partnership liabilities in the bases of their partnership interests.' 2 Prior to
ACT defines a general partnership as "an association of two or more persons to carry on as
co-owners a business for profit." UNII. PARTNERsml' ACT § 6(l), 6 U.L.A. 22 (1914). The
UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT also provides that general partners assume joint and personal
responsibility for partnership debts. UNIF. PARTNERsm ACT § 15, 6 U.L.A. 174 (1914).
Black 's Law Dictionary defines a limited partnership as:
A partnership consisting of one or more general partners, jointly and severally
responsible as ordinary partners, and by whom the business is conducted, and one
or more special partners, contributing in cash payments a specific sum as capital to
the common stock, and who are not liable for the debts of the partnership.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1121 (6th ed. 1990). The Revised Uniform Limited Partnership Act
defines a limited partnership as "a partnership formed by two or more persons under the laws
of this State and having one or more general partners and one or more limited partners."
REVISED UNIF. LIMITED PARTNERSHIP ACT § 101(7), 6 U.L.A. 271 (1976) (amended 1985)
(Supp. 1991). Further, a limited partner that does not participate in the control of the
partnership is not liable for the limited partnership's debts. REVISED UNF. LIMITED PARTNERSmP
ACT § 303(a), 6 U.L.A. 325 (1976) (amended 1985) (Supp. 1991).
7. See I.R.C. § 701 (1988) (providing that partners reflect their share of partnership
income and loss on their individual income tax returns).
8. See I.R.C. § 704(b) (1988) (describing distributive share of partnership income for
each partner).
9. See UNIF. PARTNERSHIP ACT § 15, 6 U.L.A. 174 (1914) (providing for personal
liability of general partners for partnership debts).
10. See supra note 6 (comparing personal liability of general partners with that of limited
partners).
11. See supra notes 1, 3, 5 and accompanying text (describing who bears cost of business
liabilities). If a liability provides the cash with which a business pays for a deductible item of
expense, the individual(s) or entity that will pay off the liability should receive the deduction.
The individual(s) or entity that must liquidate the liability that generated the deduction bears
the economic risk of loss with respect to that deduction. See Treas. Reg. § 1.752-2(a) (1991)
(outlining technique for determining which partners bear economic risk of loss).
12. Michael J. Close & Dan A. Kusnetz, The Final Section 704(b) Regulations: Special
Allocations Reach New Heights Of Complexity, 40 TAx LAW. 307, 308-09 (1987); William A.
Rosoff, The Road to Oz After the Execution of the Wizard: The Section 704(b) Nonrecourse
Deduction Regulations and Section 752 Debt Allocations After Tax Reform, 46 N.Y.U. TAx
INST. ch. 25 at I (1988).
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1976, the IRC imposed few limits on the allocation of items of partnership
income and loss among partners.' 3 The IRC disallowed only those special
allocations, allocations that did not parallel the partners' interests in part-
nership capital or profits, motivated by tax avoidance. 14 However, the IRC
did limit the extent to which a partner could deduct partnership losses by
the amount of his investment, or basis, in the partnership. 5
While the IRC allowed partners to increase their bases in their partner-
ship interests by their share of partnership liabilities, the regulations provided
only simplistic rules for the allocation of partnership liabilities among the
partners.' 6 Recourse liabilities of the partnership, those for which at least
one partner personally bore risk of repayment if the partnership defaulted,
increased the bases of general partners. according to the general partners'
respective interests in partnership losses. 17 Nonrecourse liabilities of the
13. See Close & Kusnetz, supra note 12, at 308-09 (describing history of IRC § 704(b)
distribution rules).
14. See Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2) (1956) (disallowing tax avoidance allocations). Prior
to 1976, the IRC § 704(b) regulations only limited the flexibility of partnership income and
loss allocations if tax avoidance composed the principal purpose of such allocations. Id.
15. I.R.C. § 704(d) (1988). IRC § 704(d) provides that a deduction for "[a] partner's
distributive share of partnership loss (including capital loss) shall be allowed only to the extent
of-the adjusted basis of such partner's interest in the partnership at the end of the partnership
year in which such loss occurred." Id.
A partner's basis in his partnership interest includes his contributions to the partnership,
his share of partnership income, and his share of partnership liabilities. I.R.C. §§ 722,
705(a)(1), 752(a) (1988). IRC § 722 provides that a partner's basis in his partnership interest
includes the amount of money he contributes to the partnership plus the adjusted basis, usually
the cost, of property he contributes to the partnership. I.R.C. § 722. IRC § 705(a)(I) provides
that a partner's basis in his partnership interest increases by the sum of his cumulative allocable
shares of partnership income. I.R.C. § 705(a)(1). IRC § 752(a) treats a partner as having made
a cash contribution to the partnership equal to any increase in his share of partnership
liabilities. I.R.C. § 752(a). Thus, the deemed cash contribution caused by an increase in a
partner's share of partnership liabilities under IRC § 752 causes an increase in the relevant
partner's basis under IRC § 722. I.R.C. §§ 752(a), 722.
IRC §§ 465 and 469 provide further limitations on partnership loss deductions. See I.R.C.
§ 465 (limiting loss deductions from certain partnership interests to amount of partner's
investment in partnership that is "at risk"); I.R.C. § 469 (limiting deductibility of losses from
certain partnership investments to amount of partner's "passive income"). The "at risk" and
"passive loss" rules of IRC §§ 465 and 469 are beyond the scope of this note which strives
to analyze the theoretical basis and mechanical techniques employed to produce initial allo-
cations of partnership income and loss.
16. See Treas. Reg. § 1.752-1(e) (1956) (providing that general partners share recourse
liabilities according to their interests in partnership losses and that both general and limited
partners share nonrecourse liabilities according to their interests in partnership profits).
17. Id. Regulation § 1.752-1(e) provided that general partners share partnership recourse
liabilities based on their loss sharing percentages. Id. The Treasury apparently based this rule
on the theory that recourse liabilities would only have to be paid by the general partners (in
lieu of the partnership) if the partnership experienced losses. See Rosoff, supra note 12, at
25-23 (describing which partners would liquidate recourse and nonrecourse partnership liabil-
ities, respectively); Treas. Reg. § 1.752-1(a)(1) (1991) (defining nonrecourse liabilities as those
partnership debts for which no partner personally bears economic risk of loss).
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partnership, generally loans secured by mortgages on real property for which
no partner bore a personal obligation to repay if the partnership defaulted,
increased the bases of both general and limited partners according to the
general and limited partners' respective interests in partnership profits." By
changing the profit and loss ratios of the partners, the partnership could
shift liabilities among the partners and, thus manipulate the partners' bases
in their partnership interests that directly affected the deductibility of the
allocated losses. 19 The following example illustrates the abuses possible under
the old loss and liability allocation rules.
EXAMPLE 1-General partner, G, and limited partner, L, form a
limited partnership that divides profits and losses equally. The
partnership borrows $1,000,000 on a nonrecourse note secured by
a mortgage on an office building the partnership purchases with
the loan proceeds. To obtain the loan, the creditor requires G to
guaranty the debt. Because the simplistic liability regulations did
not provide for the effect of personal guarantees of nonrecourse
liabilities, the partners could still treat the note as nonrecourse.
Thus, L could increase his basis by one half of the debt even
though G actually bore the entire economic risk of loss with respect
to the liability.2° Further, because the Treasury offered little guidance
18. Treas. Reg. § 1.752-1(e) (1956). Regulation § 1.752-1(e) provided that both general
and limited partners' bases increased to the extent of their profit percentages times the
nonrecourse liability. Id. The Treasury apparently based this portion of the regulation on the
theory that the partners, in lieu of the partnership, would only have to pay a nonrecourse
debt if the partnership earned profits. See Rosoff, supra note 12 at 25-23 (describing theoretical
underpinnings of Treas. Reg. § 1.752-1(e)). Otherwise, the creditor would simply repossess the
mortgaged property. Because both general and limited partners would have to sacrifice profits
to pay off the nonrecourse debt, both classes of partners should share in the basis benefits
according to their profits interest. See Rosoff, supra note 12, at 25-23 (discussing use of
profits to liquidate partnership liabilities); Treas. Reg. § 1.752-1(a)(2) (1991) (defining nonre-
course debt as those partnership liabilities for which no partner personally bears economic risk
of loss).
19. See H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 861, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 1235-36 (1984), reprinted in
1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 697, 899-900 (decrying abuse potential of old IRC § 752 regulations).
20. See Raphan v. Commissioner, 3 Ct. Cl. 457, 465-66 (1983) (holding that nonrecourse
debt guaranteed by general partner could still increase basis of limited partner's interest in
partnership), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 759 F.2d 879, 885 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (holding that
general partner's guarantee of nonrecourse debt converted debt to recourse and, thus, part-
nership could not allocate any of this debt to limited partners). The shock wave set off by
the lower court decision in Raphan resulted in congressional direction to the Treasury even
before the appellate court could rule. Howard E. Abrams, Long-Awaited Regulations Under
Section 752 Provide Wrong Answers, 44 TAX L. Rav. 627, 628-29 (1989). Congress directed
the Treasury to issue regulations that reversed this result by taking into account guarantees,
assumptions, etc. in determining which partners received liability allocations. Id. The final
regulations would now treat a previously nonrecourse debt guaranteed by a general partner,
as in Raphan, as a recourse liability and allocate all of the liability to the guaranteeing partner.
See Treas. Reg. §1.752-1(a)(1) (1991) (defining recourse liabilities as those liabilities for which
any partner bears economic risk of loss); Treas. Reg. § 1.752-2(b) (1991) (defining economic
risk of loss as obligation to make payment after constructive liquidation of partnership); Treas.
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in determining what constituted tax avoidance, 2 the partnership
could allocate disproportionately large amounts of losses, more than
fifty percent, to L. In future years, when the partnership became
profitable, it could distribute enough cash to L with which L could
pay the tax on his share of partnership income.22 Further, the
partnership could allocate no income to L if the partners so desired.
Consequently, a limited partner could receive basis generated by debt
he would never have to repay, disproportionately high amounts of losses
to deduct against this basis, and distributions of enough cash to pay any
tax liabilities in profitable years. This scenario encouraged taxpayers in high
tax brackets to purchase limited partnership interests for tax benefits rather
than for economic gains.Y
To combat the abusive allocations of tax losses and liability-generated
bases, the Treasury began issuing regulations that promoted consistency
between partnerships and other entities in determining who received loss
allocations and who could deduct them. In 1983, the Treasury issued
proposed regulations under IRC section 704(b) that severely restricted the
amount of flexibility that partnerships enjoyed over the allocation of income
and losses. u In 1988, the Treasury issued temporary regulations under IRC
section 752 that limited the flexibility allowed in shifting partnership liabil-
ities among the partners to give certain partners enough basis to deduct
losses.2 After numerous proposed regulations, temporary regulations, and
amendments to regulatioris, the Treasury issued the purported "final"
installment of regulations under IRC sections 704(b) and 752 on December
23 and 27, 1991, respectively. 26 The Treasury based these extremely complex
Reg. § 1.752-2(b)(3)(i) (1991) (requiring consideration of guarantees in determining ultimate
obligation to make payment after constructive liquidation).
21. See Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2) (1964) (omitting thorough definitions of tax avoidance
and substantial economic effect). Prior to 1976, the regulations under IRC § 704 did not treat
an allocation of partnership loss as having tax avoidance as its principal purpose if the
allocation had "substantial economic effect." Id. However, the regulations did not provide
an adequate definition of "substantial economic effect." Id.
22. See I.R.C. §§ 705(a)(2), 733(1), 731(a)(1) (1988) (decreasing partner's basis under
IRC § 705(a)(2) for cash distributions and requiring gain recognition under IRC § 733(a)(1)
for cash distributions in excess of basis). IRC §§ 705(a)(2), 733(1), and 731(a)(1) treat any
cash distributions to partners in a limited partnership in excess of the partners' bases in their
partnership interests as taxable income. Id. However, given a tax rate of less than 100%,
partners that received cash could use the after-tax proceeds to pay the tax on the flow through
of partnership income items. See I.R.C. § 1 (1988) (providing a maximum individual income
tax rate of 31%).
23. Stephen G. Utz, Partnership Taxation in Transition: Of Form, Substance, and
Economic Risk, 43 TAx LAw. 693, 694 (1990) (describing incentive for abuse provided by pre-
1985 loss and liability allocation rules).
24. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1, 48 Fed. Reg. 9871 (1983).
25. Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.752-1T to 4T (as amended by T.D. 8274, 1989-2 C.B. 101).
26. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-2 (1991); Treas. Reg. §§ 1.752-0 to 5 (1991). The following
tables show the effective dates, allocations affected and controlling rules for both sets of the
regulations from their initial issuance until December 31, 1991:
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sets of regulations and their more recent supplements on the "economic
EFFECTIVE DATES
THE IRC § 704(b) REGULATIONS
PARTNERSiiP TAX ALLOCATIONS CONTROLLING
YEARS A;FECTED RULEs
Beginning after Income, loss, etc. not Treas. Reg. § 1.704-
May 1, 1986. attributable to non-recourse l(b)(l) to (5) (as amended
debt. in 1988). See A below.
Beginning before May 1, Income, loss, etc. not Treas. Reg. § 1. 704-
1986 and after December attributable to non-resource l(b)(l) to (5) (as amended
31, 1975. debt. in 1988) or relevant case
law and legislative history
prior to May 6, 1986. See
B below.
Beginning after December Income, loss, etc. attributable Treas. Reg. § 1. 704-2
28, 1991. to non-resource debt. (1991). See C below.
Beginning before Income, loss, etc. attributablei Temp. Treas. Reg. §
December 28, 1991 and to non-recourse debt. 1.704-1T(b)(4) (iv). See D
after December 29, 1988. below.
Beginning before Income, loss, etc. Treas. Reg. § 1. 704-
December 29, 1988 and attributqable to non-recourse l(b)(4)(iv) (1986). See E
after December 31, 1986. debt. below.
Beginning before January Income, loss, etc. attributable Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1-
1, 1987 and after to non-recourse debt. (b)(4)(iv) or relevant case
December 31, 1975. law and legislative history
prior to May 1, 1986. See
F below.
CITATIONS TO TRANSIoNAL RuLns
A. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(1)(ii) (as amended in 1988).
B. Id.
C. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-2 (1991). See Treas. Reg. § 1.704-2(1) (1991) (providing
special transitional and elective rules with respect to effective dates of final
IRC § 704(b) nonrecourse regulations).
D. Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1T(b)(4)(iv)(m) (as amended by T.D. 8274, 1989-2
C.B. 101).
E. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(l)(ii) (as amended in 1988).
F. Id.
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risk of loss" theory. 27 In other words, the Treasury adopted this simple concept
for allocating both losses and liabilities: The partners who bear the economic
cost of generating a partnership expense should deduct that expense. 28
Unfortunately, after reading the lengthy and complex regulations promul-
gated under IRC sections 704(b) and 752, the tax practitioner can see the
application of the economic risk of loss concept only "through a glass darkly." 29
27. See Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.752-1T(a)(1)(iv) (as amended in 1989) (describing economic
risk of loss).
EFFECTIVE DATES
Tim IRC § 752 REGULATIONS
Liability Incurred Type of Liability Controlling Rules
After December All liabilities. Treas. Reg. § 1. 752-0 to 5
December 27, 1991. (1991). See G below.
Before December 28, 1991 All liabilities except partner Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.752-
and after January 29, 1989. loans and guarantees of non- OT to 4T (as amended in
recourse debt. 1989). See H below.
Prior to January 30, 1989. All liabilities except partner Treas. Reg. § 1.752.1(e)
loans and guarantees of non- (1956) See I. below.
resource debt.
Before December 28, 1991 Partner loans and guarantees Temp. Treas. Reg. §
and after February 28, of nonresource debt. 1.752.OT to 4T (as
1984. amended in 1989). See J.
below.
Before March 1, 1984. Partner loans and guarantees Treas. Reg. § 1.752-1(e)
of nonresource debt. (1956) See K. below.
CITATIONS TO TRANsmoNAL RULEs
G. Treas. Reg. § 1.752-5(a) (1991). See Treas. Reg. § 1.752-5(b)(1) (1991) (providing
election to apply final regulations to all partnership liabilities, regardless of
when incurred, for partnership taxable years beginning on or after December
28, 1991).
H. Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.752-4T(a) (as amended by T.D. 8274, 1989-2 C.B. 101).
See Temp. Reg. § 1.752-4T(d)(1) (1991) (as amended by T.D. 8274, 1989-2 C.B.
101) (providing election to apply temporary regulations to all partnership
liabilities, regardless of when incurred, for partnership taxable years ending
after December 29, 1988). See Temp. Reg. § 1.752-4T(d)(2) (as amended by
T.D. 8274, 1989-2 C.B. 101) (providing election to apply temporary regulations
to all liabilities incurred after December 27, 1991, but before January 1, 1992).
I. Treas. Reg. § 1.752-1(e) (1956).
J. Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.752-4T(b)(1) (as amended by T.D. 8274, 1989-2 C.B. 101).
See Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.752-4T(d)(1) (as amended by T.D. 8274, 1989-2 C.B.
101) (providing election to apply temporary regulations to all partnership liabilities,
regardless of when incurred, for partnership taxable years ending after December
29, 1988. See Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.752-4T(d)(2) (as amended by T.D. 8274, 1989-
2 C.B. 101) (providing election to apply the temporary regulations to all liabilities
incurred after December 27, 1991 but before January 1, 1992).
K. Treas. Reg. § 1.752-1(e) (1956).
28. Id.; Rosoff, supra note 12, at 25-4.
29. See I Corinthians 13:12 (King James) ("For now we see through a glass darkly; but
1992]
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An analysis of how the economic risk of loss theory drives the IRC § 704(b)
regulations' allocation of items of partnership income and loss and the IRC §
752 regulations' allocation of partnership liabilities will brighten the glass and
determine if the regulations result in practice that parallels theory.
II. Tim SECTION 704(b) REGULATIONS30
The IRC section 704(b) regulations determine to which partners a partner-
ship may allocate items of income or loss.' These regulations limit a partner-
ship's flexibility in allocating income and loss to partners by requiring that all
allocations have "substantial economic effect." '3 2 Generally, the regulations
allow a partnership to allocate losses to partners who bear the economic risk
with respect to the loss3 3 and who do not receive disproportionate tax benefits
then, face to face; now I know in part, but then shall I know even as also I am known");
ARTHu B. Wmus, ET AL., PARTNaasmP TAXATION, § 62.12 at 62-33 (4th ed. 1989) (describing
IRC § 752 temporary regulations as new level of complexity); Edward Poreba, New Regulations
Describe Rules for Allocating Partnership Liabilities, TAX'N FoR ACCT., April 1989, at 198, 203
(describing compliance with temporary regulations as burdensome); Richard E. Levine, et al., A
Practical Guide to the Section 752 Temp. Regs.-Part 1, J. TAx'N, April 1989, at 196, 196
(describing temporary regulations issued under both IRC § 704(b) and IRC § 752 as lengthy and
complex); Abrams, supra note 20, at 640 ("Quite simply, the temporary regulations [under IRC
§ 752] cannot be understood"); Close & Kusnetz, supra note 12, at 307 (brandishing self-explanatory
title).
30. See Treas. Reg. § 1.704-2 (1991) (superseding regulation § 1.704-IT's treatment of
nonrecourse deductions and modifying minimum gain and minimum gain chargeback provisions);
Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1 (as amended in 1988) (applying substantial economic effect analysis to all
partnership items of income and deductions including nonrecourse deductions); T.D. 8274, 1989-
2 C.B. 101 (amending Temp. Reg. § 1.704-iT dealing with allocation of nonrecourse deductions);
T.D. 8237, 1989-1 C.B. 180 (amending Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1 for allocations attributable to
nonrecourse liabilities); Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-iT (1988) (providing new rules for the allocation
of nonrecourse deductions); T.D. 8099, 1986-2 C.B. 84 (amending Treas. Reg. § 1.704-i to provide
for treatment of nonrecourse deductions); T.D. 8065, 1986-1 C.B. 255 (promulgating first set of
final substantial economic effect regulations); Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1, 48 Fed. Reg. 9871
(1983) (constituting Treasury's first effort at comprehensively defining substantial economic effect
and encompassing all allocations of partnership income and loss items including nonrecourse
deductions); T.D. 6771, 1964-2 C.B. 177 (listing substantial economic effect as an indicator of tax
avoidance); T.D. 6175, 1956-1 C.B. 211 (providing first partnership allocation regulations).
31. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(1)(i) (as amended in 1988).
32. Id.
33. See Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2)(ii) (as amended in 1988) (providing that effect on partners'
capital accounts should serve as guide to allocations). Regulation § 1.704-1(b)(2)(ii)'s capital account
device serves as the talisman for loss allocation and thus, helps conform partnership loss deductions
to nonpartnership loss deductions. Id.; supra notes 2-9 and accompanying text (discussing loss
allocation in nonpartnership contexts). For example, if a sole proprietor paid $100 of salary
expense he could deduct $100 on his individual return. I.R.C. § 162 (1988). Similarly, if a
partnership paid $100 of salary expense from its cash reserves, each partner in a two person
partnership that divided losses equally could deduct $50 in salary expense. I.R.C. §§ 162, 701,
702 (1988). In each case the payment of cash resulted in a decrease in the economic value of the
business to the owner(s). The tracing of deductions through liabilities requires a two-step analysis.
First, the partnership borrows $100 and uses the money to pay salary expense. Thus, the liability
gives rise to a deduction. Second, if only one of our two partners bears responsibility for repayment
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from such allocations.34 The regulations divide these two concepts into the
economic effect test and the substantiality test.35 To the extent that an allocation
of income or loss lacks either economic effect or substantiality, the partnership
must reallocate the items in accordance with the partners' interests in the
partnership.36
of the debt, he alone has his economic investment reduced. For example, if G, a general partner
bore sole liability for the repayment of the $100 while L, a limited partner, did not, only G would
have his economic value reduced. Thus, the we may trace the liability giving rise to the deduction
to G.
34. See Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2)(iii) (as amended in 1988) (providing substantiality test
for inhibiting tax avoidance).
35. See Treas. Reg. §1.704-1(b)(2)(i) (as amended in 1988) (providing that allocations must
display economic effect and that economic effect must reflect substantiality). The regulations
provide that allocation attributable to nonrecourse debt cannot have substantial economic effect
because the creditor alone bears the economic cost of those allocations. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-2(b)(1)
(1991). The partnership must allocate such items in accordance with the partners' interests in the
partnership. Id. The regulations provide a "minimum gain chargeback" technique for determining
whether an allocation of a nonrecourse item corresponds to the recipient partner's interest in the
partnership. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-2(e) (1991). The methods of allocating nonrecourse items lie
beyond the scope of this note, which seeks to explain how the economic risk of loss concept
influences the basic operation of the IRC §§ 704(b) and 752 regulations.
36. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(1)(i) (as amended in 1988). The following diagram illustrates
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A. Economic Effect
In general, the regulations determine whether a partner bears the economic
risk with respect to a loss allocation by determining if the allocation has an
adverse "economic effect" on the partner's ultimate investment in the partner-
ship. 37 The regulations provide for three types of economic effect: (1) standard
economic effect,3" (2) alternate economic effect39 and (3) economic effect
equivalence.4 The regulations determine economic effect by using a three-part
measurement system: capital account maintenance, liquidation proceeds meas-
urement, and deficit restoration measurement.4' Basically, this measurement
system determines whether a loss allocation has an economic effect on what
Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2)(ii) (as amended in 1988).
SUBSTANTIALITY
SHIFTING TAX CONSEQUENCES TEST
Capital
AccountsAgrat






Do Not Tax Liabilities
Change 1 Decrease
AND











Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2)(iii) (as amended in 1988).
37. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2)(ii) (as amended in 1988).
38. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-I(b)(2)(ii) (as amended in 1988).
39. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2)(ii)(d) (as amended in 1988).
40. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-I(b)(2)(ii)(i) (as amended in 1988).
41. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2)(ii)(b) (as amended in 1988).
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the partner has invested in the partnership now, what the partner would get
out of the partnership if it liquidated and had excess assets, and what the
partner would have to contribute back to the partnership if it liquidated with
insufficient assets.42
1. Standard Economic Effect
The standard economic effect test provided by the regulations creates a
safe harbor under which the regulations deem allocations to have economic
effect 4 A partnership can comply with the safe harbor by drafting into its
agreement provisions dealing with capital account maintenance, the distribution
of liquidation proceeds, and the obligation to restore deficit capital account
balances. 4
The "capital account maintenance" provision of the regulations measures
each partner's investment in the partnership in accordance with certain rules
to determine if allocations to the partners have standard economic effect. 4s The
regulations accomplish this measurement by requiring the partnership agreement
to incorporate an accounting device referred to as a "capital account." 46 Each
42. Id.; see also Orrisch v. Commissioner, 55 T.C. 395, 402-04 (1970) (constituting first
judicial opinion that allocations should affect amount partners would have to contribute to
eliminate any deficit in their capital accounts and amount of liquidation proceeds in which
partners could share).
43. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2)(ii) (as amended in 1988).
44. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2)(ii)(b) (as amended in 1988) (describing safe harbor
partnership agreement provisions). Regulation § 1.704-1(b)(2)(ii)(b) provides:
[A]n allocation of income, gain, loss, or deduction (or item thereof) to a partner
will have economic effect if, and only if, throughout the full term of the partnership,
the partnership agreement provides-
(1) For the determination and maintenance of the partner's capital accounts in
accordance with the rules of paragraph (b)(2)(iv) of this section,
(2) Upon liquidation of the partnership (or any partner's interest in the partner-
ship), liquidating distributions are required in all cases to be made in accordance
with the positive capital account balances of the partners, as determined after taking
into account all capital account adjustments for the partnership taxable year during
which such liquidation occurs (other than those made pursuant to this requirement
(2) and requirement (3) of this paragraph (b)(2)(ii)(b)), by the end of such taxable
year (or, if later, within 90 days after the date of such liquidation), and
(3) If such partner has a deficit balance in his capital account following the
liquidation of his interest in the partnership, as determined after taking into account
all capital account adjustments for the partnership taxable year during which such
liquidation occurs (other than those made pursuant to this requirement (3)), he is
unconditionally obligated to restore the amount of such deficit balance to the
partnership by the end of such taxable year (or, if later, within 90 days after the
date of such liquidation), which amount shall, upon liquidation of the partnership,
be paid to creditors of the partnership or distributed to other partners in accordance
with their positive capital account balances (in accordance with requirement (2) of
this paragraph (b)(2)(ii)(b)).
Id.
45. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2)(iv) (as amended in 1988).
46. Id. The partnership will keep a set of books to record partnership financial trans-
19921
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partner's capital account merely sums the total of a partner's contributions of
property and cumulative shares of income and subtracts distributions to the
partner and his share of cumulative partnership losses.47 Unlike a partner's
basis in his partnership interest, his capital account includes the fair market
value,4 rather than the adjusted tax basis,49 of property contributions and
distributions. Further, only partnership liabilities that a partner personally
assumes will increase his capital account.: Otherwise, the regulations trace the
effect of a partner's liability for partnership recourse debt via the deficit
restoration requirement.5' The following example illustrates how a partner's
capital account measures his economic investment in the partnership.
ExAwPx. 2-A and B form a general partnership by contributing $100
each. During Year 1, the partnership pays a salary expense of $25 and
no other events generating income or deduction occur. The partners
agree to allocate the $25 expense to B.
actions. From these books, the partnership must compute each partner's capital account. Once
computed, the capital account serves as the touchstone for income and loss allocation to the
various partners. At the end of the year, the partnership will file a Form 1065, U.S. Partnership
Return of Income, with the Internal Revenue Service. Treas. Reg. § 1.6033-1(a) (as amended
in 1978). The Schedule K of the Form 1065 will reflect all of the partnership income and loss
items. Instructions to Form 1065, (IRS 1991). The partnership will then send each partner a
Schedule K-i that reflects that partner's individual share of partnership income. Id. The partner
then reports the items on his Schedule K-I on his individual Form 1040, U.S. Individual
Income Tax Return. Partner's Instructions for Schedule K-I (Form 1065), (IRS 1991). Thus,
if a partner avoids involvement in the preparation of the partnership's financial statements
and tax return data, he will never compute his own capital account even though this account
directly influences how much income or loss flows through the partnership to his tax return.
47. See supra note 46 (describing capital account maintenance).
48. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2)(iv)(b) (as amended in 1988).
49. See I.R.C. § 722 (1988) (increasing partner's basis in his partnership interest by
adjusted tax basis of contributed property).
50. See Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2)(iv) (as amended in 1988) (providing for computation
of partners' capital accounts). The following table compares the computation of a partner's
capital account with a partner's basis in his partnership interest:
Capital Account Basis
Value of Property Contributed Basis of Property Contributed
+ Income Allocations + Income Allocations
-Value of Property Distributed -Basis of Property Distributed
- Loss Allocations - Loss Allocations
+ Increase in P'ship Liabilities
. Decrease in P'ship Liabilities
Partner's Capital Account Partner's Basis
See Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2)(iv) (as amended in- 1988) (regarding computation of capital
accounts); I.R.C. §§ 705, 722, 752 (1988) (regarding computation of partner's basis in his
partnership interest).
51. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2)(ii)(b)(3) (as amended in 1988). The regulations use the
minimum gain technique for allocating nonrecourse deductions. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-2(b)(2)
(1991). See infra notes 138-44 (discussing minimum gain utilization).
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A B Total
Beginning Capital Account $100 $100 $200
Salary Expense -0- (25)
Ending Capital Account $100 $75 $175
Both partners have initial capital accounts equal to their contributions.
The allocation of the $25 expense to B will affect will reduce B's
capital account and thus, the value of his economic investment in the
partnership.
The positive capital account liquidation provision of the regulations 'main-
tains the integrity of the above capital account analysis of a partner's economic
investment in the partnership when the partnership liquidates and distributes
its assets.52 The regulations require the partnership agreement to provide that
if the partnership liquidates, it will distribute partnership assets based on the
partners' positive capital account balances.53 Accordingly, distributions based
on some other motive that does not reflect the partner's investment in the
partnership as measured by the capital account cannot occur on liquidation.
The following example illustrates how the capital accounts determine the portion
of partnership assets each partner will ultimately receive upon liquidation.
ExAwLE 3-A and B form a general partnership by contributing $100
each. During Year 1, the partnership pays a salary expense of $75 and
no other items of income or deduction occur. The partnership then
liquidates at the end of Year 1. Both partners have initial capital
accounts equal to their contributions. If the partners decide to allocate
the $75 expense to B, the allocation will reduce the amount B would
receive if the partnership liquidated at the end of Year 1.
A B Total
Beginning Capital Account $100 $100 $200
Salary Expense -0- (75) (75)
Ending Capital Account $100 $25 $125
Upon liquidation of the partnership, the partners received their ending
capital account balances. Thus, B incurred an economic loss of $75
by having the entire salary expense allocated to him because the
allocations reduced his liquidation proceeds by $75.
The deficit restoration requirement of the regulations takes into consider-
ation the possibility that the partners could have negative capital account
balances if the partnership was insolvent upon liquidation.5 To retain the
accuracy of the capital account measurement device, the regulations provide
that a partnership agreement should require the partners with deficit capital
52. See Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2)(ii)(b)(2) (as amended in 1988) (requiring liquidating
distributions to track positive capital account balances).
53. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2)(ii)(b)(2) (as amended in 1988).
54. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2)(ii)(b)(3) (as amended in 1988).
WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 49:487
accounts to contribute enough cash to the partnership upon liquidation to
extinguish their respective deficits.5 The following example illustrates how the
deficit restoration obligation maintains the integrity of the capital account
measurement device when partners have negative capital accounts upon liqui-
dation.
ExA PLE 4-A and B form a general partnership by contributing $100
each. The partnership then borrows another $100 and spends all $300
of the cash on tax advice. The partners agree to allocate the deduction
to B. The partnership then liquidates.
A B Total
Beginning Capital Account $100 $100 $200
Salary Expense -0- (300) (300)
Ending Capital Account $100 ($200) ($100)
Upon liquidation of the partnership, B must contribute $200 to the
partnership of which the creditor receives $100 and A receives $100.
Thus, A lost nothing as he receives his $100 investment back. B,
however, suffered an economic loss of $300, his original investment
of $100 plus the $200 deficit contribution. Accordingly, the allocation
of the $300 expense to B had standard economic effect.
2. Alternate Economic Effect
Limited partnership agreements usually do not contain a deficit restoration
requirement because the limited partners will not agree to contribute more cash
to the partnership.5 The regulations accommodate this by providing that if a
partnership agreement includes a "qualified income offset" in lieu of a deficit
restoration requirement, the allocations may achieve alternate economic effect.Y
The regulations define a "qualified income offset" as a provision in the
partnership agreement that requires disproportionate allocations of income to
partners whose capital account balances unexpectedly drop below zero due to
distributions or certain types of loss allocations." If the partnership agreement
contains a qualified income offset, allocations of partnership income and loss
to a partner will have alternate economic effect to the extent they do not cause
or increase a deficit in a partner's capital account balance. 9 Generally, a
partnership must reallocate loss allocations in excess of the balance in a partner's
capital account in accordance with the partners' interests in the partnership, as
shown in the following example.
55. Id.
56. See Edward J. Schnee & Ed Haden, Section 704(b) Final Regulations and the Tax-
Shelter Investment: A Review, 17 CumB. L. REv. 731, 739 (1987) (describing alternate economic
effect test); supra note 6 (describing limited.partner's limited liability).
57. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2)(ii)(d)(3) (as amended in 1988).
58. Id.
59. Id.
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ExAwiE 5-General partner, G, and limited partner, L, form a limited
partnership by contributing $500 and $100, respectively. The partner-
ship agreement includes a capital account maintenance provision and
a provision requiring liquidation in accordance with positive capital
accounts, but no requirement for partners to restore deficit capital
account balances. Instead, the partnership agreement contains a qual-
ified income offset. The partnership spends $250 on tax advice during
its first year of operations. The partners agree to allocate the $250
deduction to L.
G L Total
Beginning Capital Account $500 $100 $600
Salary Allocation -0- (100) (100)
Excess Allocation (150) -0- (150)
Ending Capital Accounts $350 $-0- ($350)
Only $100 of the expense allocation to L will have alternate economic
effect because any excess would cause a deficit capital account balance.
The excess allocation would actually reduce the amount G, but not L,
would receive if the partnership liquidated. Consequently, the regula-
tions allocate the excess expense to the GA0
3. Economic Effect Equivalence
If the partnership agreement does not contain the provisions necessary to
satisfy the standard economic effect tests, an allocation can still achieve
economic effect equivalence under the "dumb, but lucky" test. 6' Under this
provision, an allocation will have economic effect equivalence if the liquidation
of the partnership at the end of the current or any future year would have the
same effect as if the partnership agreement contained all three of the standard
economic effect requirements regardless of the profitability of the partnership. 2
As the following example illustrates, economic effect equivalence generally will
only protect a partnership that allocates income and loss in accordance with
the partner's proportional capital accounts.
60. See Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(3) (as amended in 1988) (describing alternate economic
effect test).
61. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2)(ii)(i) (as amended in 1988); see also TAXATION OF PARTNERS
AND PARTNERsHips, Ernst & Whinney Continuing Education Materials, ch. 5 at 15 (1987)
(denoting economic equivalence as "dumb-but-lucky" test).
62. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2)(ii)(i) (as amended in 1988). The regulation provides:
Allocations made to a partner that do not otherwise have economic effect under
this paragraph (b)(2)(ii) shall nevertheless be- deemed to have economic effect,
provided that as of the end of each partnership taxable year a liquidation of the
partnership at the end of such year or at the end of any future year would produce
the same economic results to the partners as would occurf if requirements (1), (2),
and (3) of paragraph (b)(2)(ii)(b) of this section had been satisfied, regardless of the
economic performance of the partnership.
1992]
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ExAwLE 6-A and B form a general partnership by contributing $750
and $250, respectively. The partnership allocates profits and losses
seventy-five percent to A and twenty-five percent to B. The partnership
agreement does not require capital account maintenance and does not
require the distribution of liquidation proceeds to the partners in
accordance with their positive capital account balances. While the
partnership agreement does not contain a deficit restoration require-
ment, state law requires general partners to pay off partnership debts
in accordance with their proportional capital account interests under a
right of contribution.6 The partnership incurs a $400 expense in year
1. If the partnership agreement required capital account maintenance,
the partners would determine their capital accounts as follows:
A B Total
Beginning Capital Account $750 $250 $1,000
Expense (30) (100) M
Ending Capital Account $450 $150 $600
If the partnership liquidated at the end of year one, each partner would
receive his ending capital account balance under state law. Further, if
in future years, losses resulted in negative capital accounts, state law
would require the partners to make proportional contributions to the
partnership upon liquidation.6 Thus, due to state law, the proportional
allocations affect the partners' investments in the partnership, the
amount of positive liquidation proceeds and the amount of contributions
back to the partnership in case of liquidation with insufficient assets.
Because the partners face the same effects on their investments as if
the partnership agreement contained the three standard economic effect
provisions, the allocations achieve economic effect equivalence.6
B. Substantiality
If a partnership allocation has economic effect, the regulations will respect,
or allow, the allocation if the allocation also reflects substantiality.6 Even if an
allocation affects the total dollar amount of a partner's capital account, the
allocation could produce an artificial lowering of the partners' aggregate tax
liability. To attain substantiality, an allocation must not run afoul of any of
the following three substantiality tests: The shifting tax consequences test; the
transitory allocations test; and the general present value after-tax effects test.6
63. UNIF. PARTNERsnm ACT § 15, 6 U.L.A. 174 (1914).
64. Id.
65. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(5), Example 4(ii) (as amended in 1988).
66. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(1)(i) (as amended in 1988).
67. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2)(iii) (as amended in 1988).
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1. Shifting Tax Consequences
First, the regulations do not respect a special allocation if the allocation
fails to produce a substantial change in the partners' capital accounts, but results
in a lowering of the partners' aggregate tax liabilities9 As the following example
illustrates, this can occur when the partnership agreement specially allocates tax
favored items, such as tax-exempt income.
ExAwmE 7-A and B form a general partnership by contributing $100
each. A and B usually share all profits and losses equally under a
partnership agreement that contains the three standard economic effect
provisions. The partnership earns $50 in tax-exempt interest and $50 in
taxable dividends. A pays tax at a marginal rate of thirty-one percent
and B pays tax at a marginal rate of fifteen percent. A and B agree
to allocate all of the tax-exempt interest to A and all of the taxable
dividends to B. 9
A B Total
Beginning Capital Accounts $100 $100 $200
Tax-Exempt Interest 50 -0- 50
Taxable Dividends -0- 50 50
Ending Capital Accounts $150 $150 $300
Tax Liabilities:
With Special Allocations70  $4)- $7.50 $7.50
With Equal Allocations71  (7.75) (3.75) (11.50)
Difference ($7.75) $3.75 ($4.00
68. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2)(iii)(b) (as amended in 1988). The text of the regulation
providing the shifting tax consequences test appears below:
The economic effect of an allocation (or allocations) in a partnership taxable year
is not substantial if, at the time the allocation (or allocations) becomes part of the
partnership agreement, there is a strong likelihood that-
(1) [t]he net increases and decreases that will be recorded in the partners' capital
accounts for such taxable year will not differ substantially from the net increases
and decreases that would be recorded in such partners' respective capital accounts
for such year if the allocations were not contained in the partnership agreement,
and
(2) [t]he total tax liability of the partners (for their respective taxable years in which
the allocations will be taken into account) will be less than if the allocations were
not contained in the partnership agreement (taking into account tax consequences
that result from the interaction of the allocation (or allocations) with partner tax
attributes that are unrelated to the partnership).
Id.
69. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(5), Example 7(ii) (as amended in 1988).
70. A's tax liability equals S-0- ($-0- taxable income X 31%). B's tax liability equals
$7.50 ($50 in taxable dividends X 15%).
71. A's tax liability equals $7.75 ($25 of taxable dividends X 31%). B's tax liability
equals $3.75 ($25 of taxable income X 15%).
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The special allocation did not change the partners' capital accounts,
but did reduce the aggregate tax liability of the partners. Even
though the allocation has economic effect, it lacks substantiality
because it shifted one-half of the beneficial tax consequences of the
tax-exempt income from B to A.
72
2. Transitory Allocations
Second, if the regulations classify an allocation as transitory, the allo-
cation fails the substantiality test.73 The regulations define transitory allo-
cations as a group of equal and offsetting allocations spanning two or more
years 74 that:
1. When viewed together do not substantially affect the partners'
capital accounts, 7 and
2. Result in an overall lowering of the partners' aggregate tax
liability.
76
The following example illustrates how the "flip-flop" ' " of allocations may
violate the transitory allocation test and thus, vitiate substantiality.
EXAMPLE 8-A and B form a general partnership by contributing
$100 each. Usually, A and B share profits and losses equally. For
each of Years 1 and 2, the partnership earns $100 of taxable interest
and incurs $50 in salary deductions. In Year 1, A wins $1,000,000
in a lottery and pays tax at a marginal rate of thirty-one percent.
In Year 2, A returns to his usual marginal rate of fifteen percent.
B Pays tax at a marginal rate of fifteen percent for both Years 1
and 2. In order to lessen A's combined two-year tax burden, A and
B agree to allocate the entire salary deduction to A and the entire
interest income to B for Year 1. In Year 2, A and B agree to
reverse the Year 1 allocation.
72. See supra note 68 and accompanying text (describing shifting tax consequences test).
73. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2)(iii)(c) (as amended in 1988). This regulation only applies
this test if a strong likelihood exists at the time the partnership agreement adopts allocation
that the allocations will be transitory. Id.
74. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2)(iii)(c)(l) (as amended in 1988).
75. Id.
76. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-I(b)(2)(iii)(c)(3) (as amended in 1988). If the offsetting allocation
occurs more than five years after the original allocation, the regulations presume the substan-
tiality of the allocation. Id. Further, if the partnership agreement provides for allocations
spanning several years, the regulations measure offsetting allocations on a first-in, first-out
basis. Id.
77. See Schnee & Haden, supra note 56, at 749-50 (discussing effect of allocation "flip-
flop" on substantiality of allocations); WILLIS, ET AL., supra note 29, at 62-23 (discussing
partnership "flips" in profits or losses).
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Year 1 Year 2
A B A B
Beginning Cap. Acct. $100 $100 $50 $200
Taxable Interest -0- 100 100 -0-
Salary Deduction (50) -0- -0- (50)
Ending Cap. Accounts $50 . $200 $150 $150
Tax Liabilities $(15.50) $15.00 $15.00 $(7.50)
Tax Liab.
with Equal Alloc. $7.75 $3.75 $3.75 $3.75
Two-Year Totals:
With Special Allocations $(.50) $7.50
With Equal Allocations 11.50 7.50
Difference $11.00 $__
While the capital accounts remain equal after the end of Year 2,
the total tax liabilities do not. Because A received a deduction at
thirty-one percent in Year 1 and paid tax on two years worth of
partnership income in Year 2 at fifteen percent, the special allocation
decreased his two-year total tax liability. The regulations will hold
the allocation insubstantial.
78
3. General Present Value After-Tax Effects
Third, if a special allocation yields an increase in the present value of
one partner's after-tax consequences without significantly decreasing the
present value after-tax consequences of any other partner, the regulations
deem the allocation insubstantial. 79 In effect, this test requires a comparison
of the after-tax results to each partner with the allocation to the after-tax
results without the allocation. 0 While this comparison approximates the
shifting tax consequences test, its use of present value analysis requires
consideration of the long-term effects of various allocation schemes similar
to the transitory allocations test.8' The following example illustrates the
operation of the present value after-tax effects test.
ExAMPLE 9-A and B form a general partnership by contributing
$100 each. The partnership buys a long-term municipal bond and
a long-term taxable bond. For the next several years, the partnership
will earn $5 of taxable interest and $5 of tax-exempt interest each
year. A has significant net operating loss carryovers and will pay
no taxes during the next 10 years. B, however, expects to pay tax
at a marginal rate of thirty-one percent for the foreseeable future.
A and B agree to allocate the $5 of tax-exempt interest to B and
the $5 of taxable interest to A for the next ten years. While the
78. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2)(iii)(c) (as amended in 1988).
79. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2)(iii)(a) (as amended in 1988).
80. Id.
81. See Gregory J. Marich, Substantial Economic Effect and the Value Equals Basis
Conundrum, 42 TAx L. REv. 509, 545-46 (1987) (describing present value after-tax effect test
for determining partners' interests).
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capital accounts of the partners will remain equal after the above
allocations, the after-tax results will not.
Sum of Years 1 - 10
A B Total
Beginning Capital Accounts $100 $100 $200
Tax-Exempt Interest -0- 50 50
Taxable Interest 50 -0- 50
Ending Capital Accounts $150 $150 $300
After-Tax Results: $ 50 $ 50 $100
With Special Allocation
Tax-Exempt Interest (25) (25) (50)
Taxable Interest (25) (17.25) (42.25)
Difference $ -0- $7.75 $7.75
Present-Value of After-tax Results (6%):
With Special Allocation $36.80 $36.80 $73.60
With Equal Allocations (36.80) (31.10) (67.90)
Difference $ -0- $ 5.70 $ 5.70
% Difference -0-% 15.5% 7.75%.
Because of his net operating losses, A pays no tax regardless of
whether the partnership comprises his $5 per year allocation of
taxable interest or tax-exempt interest. Since B pays tax at a thirty-
one percent rate, he would pay $7.75 in tax, $25 of taxable interest
times 31 percent, if the partnership allocated one-half of the taxable
interest to him. On a present value basis, using a discount rate of
six percent, B's cumulative after-tax income would increase by $5.70,
or fifteen and one-half percent, if the partnership allocates all the
tax-exempt income to him and all the taxable interest to A for the
ten-year period. Thus, the special allocation of all the taxable interest
to A and all the tax-exempt interest to B does not effect A's present
value after-tax consequences while it increases B's present value
after-tax consequences. Thus, the regulations will deem the special
allocation insubstantial and reallocate the income amount in accor-
dance with the partners interests in the partnership.
2
C. Partners' Interests in the Partnership
If an allocation of partnership income or loss lacks economic effect or
substantiality, the regulations will reallocate the item for tax purposes among
82. See Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(5), Example 5 (as amended in 1988) (holding similar
allocation insubstantial); infra note 83 and accompanying text (discussing partners' interests in
partnership). The example in the regulations deems the special allocation insubstantial when it
only increases the after-tax consequences of the benefitting partner by approximately 6.7%.
The regulations do not specify a bright-line percentage for determining when a special allocation
that increases the present value after-tax consequences to a partner, goes too far. Id.
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the partners based on their interests in the partnership. s3 The regulations
provide three methods for determining the partners' interests in the part-
nership: the proportional changes in capital accounts technique, the mock
adjusted tax basis liquidation technique, and the general facts and circum-
stances test. 4
1. Proportional Changes in Capital Accounts
First, where a special allocation involves tax favored items, such as tax-
exempt interest,8" the regulations determine each partner's interest in the
allocation by determining the net increases and decreases in the partners'
capital accounts caused by all allocations.16 The regulations, as the following
example shows, then require the partnership to reallocate proportional
83. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(1)(i) (as amended in 1988).
84. See Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(3) (as amended in 1988). The following diagram illustrates
the concepts regarding the partners' interests in the partnership embodied in the regulations.
PARTNERS' INTERESTS IN THE PARTNERSHIP
PROPORTIONAL CHANGES IN CAPITAL ACCOUNTS
[Allocations Involve Tax-Favored Items]
Every Partner Gets a Proportion of Each Item
OR
MOCK ADJUSTED TAX BASIS LIQUIDATION






FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES TEST
General Division of Profits and Losses
85. See Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(5), Examples 5(i), (ii), 6, 7(i), (ii), 10(i) (as amended
in 1988) (describing use of proportional changes in capital accounts technique when allocations
involve tax favored items). While the regulations do not define "tax favored items" they
indicate by example that this term includes those items that could generate less tax liability
than an equivalent allocation of ordinary income. Id.
86. Id.
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amounts of all items of income and loss to each partner based on the
proportion of total gross income each partner received under the special
allocation scheme.
8 7
EXAMLE 10-A and B form a general partnership by contributing
$100 each. A and B usually share all profits and losses equally.
The partnership earns $50 in tax-exempt interest and $50 in taxable
dividends. A pays tax at a marginal rate of thirty-one percent and
B pays tax at a marginal rate of fifteen percent. A and B agree to
allocate all of the tax-exempt interest to A and all of the taxable
dividends to B. The allocation of all the tax-exempt interest to A
would lack substantiality under the shifting tax consequences test."
Consequently, the regulations reallocate both the tax favored items,
the tax-exempt interest, and the nontax favored items, the taxable
dividends, among the partners according to the proportion of gross
income each partner received. A received 50% of the total gross
income, $50 of tax-exempt interest divided by the sum of $50 of
tax-exempt interest and $50 of dividend income. Thus, each partner
must receive a like proportion of each type of partnership income.
A B
% Amount % Amount
Tax-Exempt Interest 50% $25 50% $25
Taxable Dividends 50% 25 50% 25
Total Reallocation $50 $50
Because each partner's capital account increased by fifty percent of
the total partnership gross income, each partner has a fifty percent
interest in each item of partnership income. 9
2. Mock Adjusted Tax Basis Liquidation
Second, if an allocation lacks substantial economic effect solely because
the partnership does not contain a deficit restoration requirement, the
regulations determine the interests of the partners via the legal fiction of a
constructive liquidation.90 The regulations compare the results of a construc-
tive liquidation of the partnership before and after the allocation.9 1 The
regulations assume that the partnership sells all of its assets for their adjusted
tax bases and then liquidates: the "mock adjusted tax basis liquidation. "92
87. Id.
88. See supra Example 7 (illustrating shifting tax consequences test).
89. Id.
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As the following example illustrates, this technique mirrors the capital
account tracking methodology employed by the standard economic effect
test.
EXAmPLE 1 1-General partner, G, and limited partner, L, form a
limited partnership by contributing $40 and $10, respectively. The
partnership then borrows $450 and buys a piece of machinery for
$500. The machinery generates a depreciation expense of $100 during
Year 1. The partners agree to allocate all the depreciation expense
to L. Because the partnership agreement does not require the
partners to restore a deficit in their capital accounts upon liquidation
of the partnership, the allocation does not have economic effect
under the regulations.93 Accordingly, the depreciation must be real-
located to the partners based on their interests in the partnership.
To determine these interests, the regulations assume the partnership
sells the machine at the beginning of the year before any depreciation
deduction, and liquidates by distributing all the proceeds to the
partners.Y
Distribution of Sales Proceeds
Bank G L Total
Beginning of Year 1:
Machine Sold For $500 $450 $ 40 $ 10 $500
End of Year 1:
Machine Sold for $400 - 450 - (50) -0- - 400
Difference $-0- $90 $10 $100
In the above example, local law would require G, the general
partner, to restore sufficient funds, $50, to the partnership to pay
off the bank's debt at the end of Year 1.9- Thus, G bore $90 of
the economic burden associated with the $100 depreciation deduction
and L bore $10 of the burden. The regulations reallocate the
depreciation deduction in accordance with the economic burden
borne by each partner: $90 to G and $10 to L.9
6
3. Facts and Circumstances
Finally, if an allocation does not involve tax favored items and lacks
substantial economic effect for a reason other than the absence of a deficit
93. See supra note 6 and accompanying text (discussing joint and several liability of
partners).
94. Id.
95. See UNw. PARTNERsmp AcT § 15, 6 U.L.A. 174 (1914) (imposing liability on partners).
96. See Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(5), Example 15 (as amended in 1988) (illustrating mock
adjusted tax basis' liquidation technique). The example in the text illustrates the general
principles of the mock adjusted tax basis liquidation technique in a somewhat more simplified
manner.
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restoration requirement, the regulations determine the partners' interests in
the partnership by examining the surrounding facts and circumstances.9
Using these facts and circumstances, the regulations determine the general
division of profits and losses in the partnership. 9
Thus, the section 704(b) regulations use various accounting devices to
determine if a loss allocation affects each partner's investment in the
partnership.9 If the allocation affects a partner's economic investment in
the partnership without producing substantial tax avoidance consequences,'0
the regulations allow the partner to receive the loss allocation from the
partnership. 1 1
III. Ti SECTION 752 REGULATIONS'0 2
While the IRC section 704(b) regulations determine which partner re-
ceives the allocation of partnership loss, 03 the IRC section 752 regulations
determine whether that partner will have sufficient liability-generated basis
to deduct the loss.1 °4 The IRC section 752 regulations allocate partnership
97. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(3)(i) (as amended in 1988). The regulation provides the
following nonexhaustive list of factors for consideration:
(a) The partners' relative contributions to the partnership,
(b) The interests of the partners in the economic profits and losses (if different than
the taxable income or loss),
(c) The interests of the partners in cash flow and other non-liquidating distributions,
and
(d) The rights of the partners to distributions of capital upon liquidation.
Id.
98. Id.
99. See Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2)(ii) (as amended in 1988) (describing economic effect
test).
100. See Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2)(iii) (as amended in 1988) (describing substantiality
test).
101. See Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(1)(i) (as amended in 1988) (validating allocations that
have substantial economic effect).
102. See Treas. Reg. § 1.752-1 to 5 (1991) (applying economic risk of loss analysis to
partnership liabilities and modifying Prop. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.752-1 to 5 for guarantees of
interest, pledges of assets, and certain de minimis rules); Prop. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.752-I to 5,
56 Fed. Reg. 36707 (1991) (suggesting modifications in temporary regulations application of
economic risk of loss theory to partnership liabilities); Temp. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.752-1T to 4T
(as amended in by T.D. 8274, 1989-2 C.B. 101) (applying economic risk of loss theory to
partnership liabilities for first time); Treas. Reg. § 1.752-1(e) (1956) (promulgating original
loss percentages for recourse debt and profit percentages for nonrecourse debt rules).
Fortunately, the Treasury abandoned attempts to draft all possible ambiguity out of the
IRC section 752 regulations. See generally, Bayless Manning, Hyperlexis and the Law of
Conservation of Ambiguity: Thoughts on Section 385, 36 TAx LAw. 9, 10-12 (1982) (lamenting
Treasury's practice of promulgating overly long and complex regulations to deal with rare fact
situations instead of issuing simple rules that deal with ninety percent of real life fact scenarios).
103. See supra notes 30-55 and accompanying text (requiring loss allocations to reflect
substantial economic effect).
104. See Treas. Reg. § 1.752-1 to 5 (1991) (determining which partners receive allocations
of partnership liabilities that increase their bases in their partnership interests). Section 704(d)
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liabilities'05 to the partners who bear the economic risk of loss with respect
to those liabilities.101 First, the IRC section 752 regulations borrow and
limits the amount of partnership loss that may flow through to a partner by the amount of
the partner's basis in his partnership interest. I.R.C. § 704(d) (1988). Section 722 provides that
cash contributions increase a partner's basis in his partnership interest. I.R.C. § 722 (1988).
Section 752(a) treats an increase in a partner's share of partnership liabilities as a cash
contribution by the partner to the partnership. I.R.C. § 752(a) (1988). Thus, an increase in a
partner's share of liabilities increases his basis in his partnership interest and consequently,
the amount of partnership losses that can flow through to him.
Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.752-lT(a)(1)(iv) discussed the theoretical kinship of the regulations
issued under IRC § 704(b) and IRC § 752:
The economic risk of loss analysis employed in this section generally corresponds
to, and further develops, the economic risk of loss employed in the regulations
under section 704(b). The coordination of these two sections reflects the fact that
one of the principal purposes for including partnership liabilities in the bases of the
partners' interests in the partnership is to support the deductions that will be claimed
by the partners for the items attributable to those liabilities.
Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.752-1T(a)(1)(iv) (as amended by T.D. 8274, 1989-2 C.B. 101).
105. See Treas. Reg. § 1.752-2(0, Example 8 (1991) (disregarding contingent liabilities for
purposes of IRC § 752); see also Treas. Reg. § 1.752-2(g) (1991) (requiring computation of
liabilities using time value of money principles). Thus, if the partnership agreement allows a
partner to wait more than 90 days to restore his capital account deficit upon actual liquidation
of the partnership, the regulations will discount that partner's share of partnership liabilities.
See Treas. Reg. § 1.752-2(g)(4) (1991) (giving example of when partners must make discount
computation). The regulations assign the discount amount relating to the delayed contribution
obligation to partners who must restore their deficits within the ninety-day period, as mandated
by the IRC § 704(b) regulations. Id.; Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2)(ii)(b)(2) (as amended in 1988).
This assignment of the discount to the nondelayed partner seems illegitimate, however, because
the nondelayed payor will never pay that amount to the partnership and thus, would not
appear to bear the economic risk of loss with respect to that amount. The partners could
potentially shift economic risk of loss via the time value of money principles by delaying the
deficit restoration requirements of certain partners who do not need liability-generated basis.
Unlike the final regulations, the temporary regulations defined a liability as:
[A]ny obligation ... to the extent ... that holding such obligation gives rise to
(1) [t]he creation of, or increase in, the basis of any property owned by the obligor
(including cash attributable to borrowings); (2) [a] deduction that is taken into
account in computing the taxable income of the obligor; or (3) [a]n expenditure that
is not deductible in computing the obligor's taxable income and is not properly
chargeable to capital.
Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.752-1T(g) (as amended in 1989).
Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.752-IT(k), Example 2(ii) (as amended in 1989) illustrates that the
above definition will deny liability classification to interest expense accrued by a cash basis
partnership. This result occurs because the cash basis partnership would not take into account
accrued expenses in determining its taxable income. The Treasury omitted these definitions
from the final regulations without official comment.
106. See Treas. Reg. § 1.752-2(a) (1991) (allocating liabilities based on economic risk of
loss principles). This regulation reflects the direction of Congress in Section 79 of the Deficit
Reduction Act of 1984. Tan DEarcrr RErucnoN AcT oF 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 79, 98
Stat. 597 (1984). After the Claims Court ruled in Raphan v. United States, 3 Ct. Cl. 457
(1983), that a general partner's guarantee of a nonrecourse debt did not vitiate the nonrecourse
character of the debt, Congress instructed the Treasury to issue regulations regarding the
allocation of liabilities among the partners. H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 861, 98th Cong., 2d Sess.
1235-36 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 697, 899-900. "... . [T]he conferees intend
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modify the mock adjusted tax basis liquidation technique employed by the
IRC section 704(b) regulations to analyze the effect on partners capital
accounts of a constructive liquidation. 07 Second, the IRC section 752
regulations impose a three-level obligations analysis to determine which
partners bear the economic risk of loss with respect to liabilities and thus,
which liabilities constitute recourse liabilities and which constitute nonre-
course liabilities of the partnership.10 Third, the regulations allocate recourse
liabilities to those partners who would have to make a net payment under
the three-level obligations analysis'09 and allocate nonrecourse liabilities using
a three-step allocation scheme." 0
A. The Zero-Sale Constructive Liquidation
In general, the regulations determine the effect on the partners if the
partnership sold its assets for nothing, liquidated, and paid off the outstand-
ing balance of all the liabilities: the zero-sale constructive liquidation." The
zero-sale constructive liquidation technique enables the partnership to apply
the three-level obligations analysis for purposes of classifying a liability as
recourse or nonrecourse and for purposes of determining which partner
would have to ante up if the partnership entered insolvency and the creditors
appeared at the gate." 2 Specifically, the zero-sale constructive liquidation
that the revisions to the section 752 regulations will be based largely on the manner in which
the partners ... share the economic risk of loss with respect to partnership debt . . . ." Id.
In response to this congressional directive, the Treasury issued temporary regulations under
IRC § 752 in 1988 based on the economic risk of loss theory. Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.752-
1T(1)(i) (as amended by T.D. 8274, 1989-2 C.B. 101).
107. See Treas. Reg. § 1.752-1(a)(1), (2) (1991) (requiring constructive liquidation of
partnership to determine which partners, if any, bear economic risk of loss with respect to
partnership liabilities).
108. Treas. Reg. § 1.752-2(b)(1), (3) (1991). The regulation provides:
[A] partner bears the economic risk of loss for a partnership liability to the extent
that, if the partnership constructively liquidated, the partner or related person would
be obligated to make a payment to any person (or a contribution to the partnership)
because the liability becomes due and payable and the partner or related person
would not be entitled to reimbursement from another partner or person that is a
related person to another partner.
Treas. Reg. § 1.752-2(b)(1) (1991).
109. See Treas. Reg. § 1.752-2(a)(1) (1991) (requiring allocation of recourse liabilities to
those partners who bear economic risk of loss with respect to those liabilities).
110. Treas. Reg. § 1.752-3(a)(1), (2), (3) (1991).
111. Treas. Reg. § 1.752-2(b)(1) (1991).
112. See Treas. Reg. § 1.752-1(a)(1), (2) (1991) (describing recourse liabilities as those
liabilities for which at least one partner bears economic risk of loss and nonrecourse liabilities
as those liabilities for which no partner bears economic risk of loss); Treas. Reg. § 1.752-
2(b)(1) (1991) (providing that constructive liquidation technique determines which partners, if
any, bear economic risk of loss with respect to partnership liabilities).
See also Treas. Reg. § 1.752-2(b)(1) (1991) (considering all types of payments that partners
must make upon liquidation). This takes into account the possibility that a partner may have
to pay a creditor directly (guaranty), another partner directly (indemnification) or the part-
nership (through a deficit restoration provision in the partnership agreement). Because the IRC
FINAL REGULATIONS UNDER 704(b) and 752
technique measures each partner's capital accounts after the following
fictional events take place:
1. The partnership sells all of its assets, including cash, for their
deemed "fair market values,":'
a. unsecured assets for zero,1 4 and
§ 704(b) regulations require a partnership agreement to mandate capital account deficit
restoration in order to achieve standard economic effect, general partnerships must use the
capital accounts to determine the economic risk of loss. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2)(ii)(b)(3)
(as amended in 1988). Further, the IRC § 704(b) regulations deem a partnership a'rreement to
contain a deficit restoration requirement if local law effectively requires the partners to make
up any deficit account balances. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2)(iii)(c) (as amended in 1988).
Because the IRC § 704(b) regulations increase capital accounts by the fair market value of
property rather than its basis, local law contribution requirements (e.g., Uiw. PARTNERs P
AcT § 15, 6 U.L.A. 174 (1914)) may produce somewhat different results than the standard
deficit restoration requirement provided by the IRC § 704(b) regulations. Treasury Regulation
§ 1.704-1(b)(2)(iv)(b) (as amended in 1988).
Regulation § 1.752-2(b)(1) describes the constructive liquidation now required under IRC
§ 752 as follows:
Upon a constructive liquidation, all of the following events are deemed to occur
simultaneously:
(i) All of the partnership's liabilities become payable in full;
(ii) With the exception of property contributed to secure a partnership liability
(see § 1.752-2(h)(2)), all of the partnership's assets, including cash, have a value of
zero;
(iii) The partnership disposes of all of its property in a fully taxable transaction
for no consideration (except for relief from liabilities for which the creditor's right
to repayment is limited solely to one or more assets of the partnership);
(iv) All items of income, gain, loss, or deduction are allocated among the partners;
and
(v) The partnership liquidates.
Treas. Reg. § 1.752-2(b)(1) (1991).
113. See Treas. Reg. § 1.752-2(b)(1)(ii) (1991) (deeming fair market value of all assets,
except those contributed to partnership to secure partnership debt, to equal $-0-). The final
regulations provide that a partner bears the economic risk of loss with respect to a liability to
the extent of the fair market value of his separate property that he pledges as security for the
partnership liability. Treas. Reg. § 1.752-2(h)(1) (1991). Further, the final regulations clarify
that a partner bears the economic risk with respect to a partnership liability to the extent of
the fair market value of property that the partner contributes to the partnership solely to
secure the liability. Treas. Reg. § 1.752-2(h)(2) (1991).
While the regulations actually spell out five steps, the author compressed these into three
steps in the name of conciseness, hopefully, without sacrificing substance. See supra note 112
and accompanying text (quoting text of regulations).
114. See Treas. Reg. § 1.752-2(b)(1)(iii) (1991) (providing $-0- amount realized regardless
of liability relief). But cf. Crane v. Commissioner, 331 U.S. 1, 14 (1947) (including debt
released on sale or exchange of assets in amount realized). The regulations do not assume the
partnership's creditors release the partners from the debt; rather, the partners pay the debts
with their personal assets. Treas. Reg. § 1.752-2(b)(1) (1991).
The regulations provide that where the capital accounts reflect a fair market value that
differs from the adjusted tax bases of partnership property, the book value rather than the
adjusted tax basis will determine the loss upon a constructive liquidation. See Treas. Reg. §
1.752-2(b)(ii) (1991) (stating, "[the] loss on the deemed disposition of the partnership's assets
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b. secured assets for the remaining principal amount of the
respective liabilities," 5
2. The partnership allocates the gains and losses resulting from 1.
to the partners," 6 and
is computed [by recognizing] a loss equal to the value of the remaining tax basis (or book
value to the extent section 704(c) or § 1.704-1(b)(4)(i) applies) of all the partnership's assets
... "). See I.R.C. § 704(c) (1988) (allocating gain generated by asset sale to partner that
contributed asset to extent that asset's fair market value exceeded its adjusted basis when
contributed). The cited IRC § 704(b) regulation provides:
If partnership property is, under paragraphs (b)(2)(iv)(d) [contributed property] or
(b)(2)(iv)(f) [revalued property] of the section, properly reflected in the capital
accounts of the partners and on the books of the partnership at a book value that
differs from the adjusted tax basis of such property, then depreciation, depletion,
amortization, and gain or loss, as computed for book purposes, with respect to such
property will be greater or less than the depreciation, depletion, amortization, and
gain or loss, as computed for tax purposes, with respect to such property. In these
cases, the capital accounts of the partners are required to be adjusted solely for
allocations of the book value to such partners (see paragraph (b)(2)(iv)(g) of this
section), and the partners' shares of the corresponding tax items are not independently
reflected by further adjustments to the partners' capital accounts. Thus, separate
allocations of these tax items cannot have substantial economic effect under para-
graph (b)(2)(ii)(b)(1) of this section, and the partners' distributive shares of such tax
items must (unless governed by section 704(c)) be determined in accordance with the
partners' interests in the partnership. These tax items must be shared among the
partners in a manner that takes account of the variation between the adjusted tax
basis of such property and its book value in the same manner as variations between
the adjusted tax basis and fair market value of property contributed to the partnership
are taken into account in determining the partners' shares of tax items under section
704(c).
Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(4)(i) (as amended in 1988).
In effect, the regulations provide that the differential between fair market value and
adjusted tax basis with respect to partnership property must be allocated to the appropriate
partners. Id. The appropriate partners will be the contributing partners in the case of property
with a pre-contribution value-basis differential and the revaluing partners in the case of
revalued partnership property. See Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(5), Example 18 (as amended in
1988) (showing how value differentials affect income and loss allocations). Thus, the construc-
tive liquidation called for under Treas. Reg. § 1.752-2(b)(I) will result in the allocation of
book losses to partners' capital accounts in order to determine which partners, if any, must
use personal assets to liquidate partnership liabilities. Treas. Reg. § 1.752-2(b)(2)(ii) (1991).
115. See Treas. Reg. § 1.752-2(b)(1)(iii) (1991) (including relief from nonrecourse liabilities,
those liabilities limited to repayment from securing assets, in amount realized). Thus, the
partnership can actually have gain on the constructive liquidation to the extent that the face
amount of securing debt exceeds the adjusted tax basis, or book value, of the securing asset.
Id. The partnership must allocate both the gains generated from the sale of secured property
for the remaining principal balance of the nonrecourse debt and the losses generated by the
deemed sale of unsecured assets in the zero-sale liquidation. Treas. Reg. § 1.752-2(b)(1)(iv)
(1991).
116. See Treas. Reg. § 1.752-2(b)(1)(iv) (1991) (allocating all items of "income, gain, loss,
or deduction" to partners after deemed sale of assets). However, since the partnership sells
all of its assets for $-0-, a loss equal to the adjusted basis of the assets will generally result.
Id.
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3. The partnership liquidates and pays off the remaining principal
amounts of its liabilities.1
7
The following examples illustrate two basic applications of the zero-sale
constructive liquidation technique.
EXAmPLE 12-A and B form a general partnership by contributing
$100 each. The partnership uses the $200 and borrows another $800
on an unsecured recourse note to purchase a storage building. The
partnership agreement provides that A and B will receive ninety
percent and ten percent, respectively, of all profits and losses.
Immediately upon purchase of the storage building, a zero-sale
constructive liquidation would result in a loss of $1,000 to the
partnership, $-0- amount realized minus $1,000 basis for the storage
building. The following table shows the capital account effects of
the ninety and ten percent allocation:
A B Total
Beginning Capital Accounts $100 $100 $200
Loss Allocation (900) (100) (1,000)
Ending Capital Accounts ($800) $ -0- ($800)
Thus, A bears the economic risk of loss with respect to the entire
$800 liability.
EXA PLE 13-A and B form a general partnership by contributing
$100 each. The partnership uses the $200 and $800 borrowed on a
recourse note to purchase a storage building. The partnership agree-
ment provides that A and B will receive sixty percent and forty
percent, respectively, of all profits and losses. Immediately upon
purchase of the storage building, a zero-sale constructive liquidation
would result in a loss of $1,000 to the partnership, $-0- amount
realized minus $1,000 basis for the storage building. The following
table shows the capital account effects of the sixty percent/forty
percent allocation:
A B Total
Beginning Capital Accounts $100 $100 $200
Loss Allocation (600) (400) (1,000)
Ending Capital Accounts ($500) ($300) ($800)
Thus, A bears $500 and B bears $300 of the economic risk of loss
with respect to the $800 liability.
Depending on how partners share profits and losses, the zero-sale
constructive liquidation technique will result in different negative capital
account balances for the partners. The regulations then require the appli-
117. Treas. Reg. § 1.752-2(b)(1)(i), (v) (1991).
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cation of the three-level obligations analysis to determine which partner, if
any, would have to make a contribution to the partnership, or a creditor,
to satisfy outstanding partnership liabilities." 8
B. Three-Level Obligations Analysis
The three-level obligations analysis determines which partner, if any,
must make such a contribution" 9 by taking into account deficit restoration
provisions in the partnership agreement, 20 guarantees, 2' assumptions,'2 and
118. Treas. Reg. § 1.752-2(b)(3) (1991).




Capital Account $ 100 S 100
Loss on Construc-
tive Liquidation (100) (NO)
Deficits $ -0- S (800)
-0- (800)
LEVEL ONE: PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENT
Deficit Restoration Requirment? No
-0- -0-
LEVEL TWO: EX-AGREEMENT CONTRACTS
Guarantees, Indemnifications, Etc.? Yes
-0- 1(800)
LEVEL THREE: STATE LAW
Deficit Satisfaction, Subrogation, Etc.? Yes
I I
S (800) $ -0-
120. Treas. Reg. § 1.752-2(b)(3)(ii) (1991).
121. Treas. Reg. § 1.752-2(b)(3)(i) (1991). The temporary regulations under IRC § 752
provided that where one or more partners undertake a contractual obligation that eliminates
substantially all of the risk to the creditor of a default by the partnership because the
contracting partner or partners will pay off the debt if the partnership cannot, the partners
have guaranteed the loan. Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.752-1T(d)(3)(iv) (as amended in 1989).
BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY defines the verb "guaranty" as follows: "To undertake collaterally
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state law contribution requirements.123 The first level in the analysis examines
the partnership agreement to determine if it mandates that partners con-
tribute money to the partnership upon liquidation.' 24 Under level one, the
partners in Examples 12 and 13 would bear the economic risk of loss to
the extent of their negative capital accounts if the partnership agreement
contained a deficit restoration provision. 2' Second, the regulations analyze
contracts outside the partnership agreement, ex-agreement contracts, to
determine if partners would pay creditors directly or indemnify other part-
ners if the creditors demanded payment. 26 Third; the regulations analyze
how applicable state law may affect the results produced by the partnership
agreement and any ex-agreement contracts. 27 If, after application of all
three analytical levels, any partner would have to make a payment to the
partnership, another partner, or a creditor with respect to a partnership
liability, the regulations classify the liability as recourse and allocate it to
the partner on whom the payment burden would fall. 2 The following
example illustrates the three-level obligations analysis:
to answer for the payment of another's debt or the performance of another's duty, liability,
or obligation ..... " BLAcK's LAW DICTIONARY 705 (6th ed. 1990).
122. Treas. Reg. § 1.752-1(d) (1991). Unlike the final regulations, the temporary regulations
defined an assumption as occurring where an agreement subjects the assuming partner to
personal liability with respect to the assumed obligation and, in the case of a partnership
obligation, the creditor is aware of the assumption and can directly enforce it and no other
partner would bear the economic risk of loss for such liability. Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.752-
IT(f) (as amended in 1989). This definition closely parallels the definition used in the IRC §
704(b) regulations for determining when the assumption of a partnership liability will increase
a partner's capital account. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2)(c) (as amended in 1988). Black's Law
Dictionary defines "assumption" as "[t]he undertaking or adoption of a debt or obligation
primarily resting upon another, as where the purchaser of real estate 'assumes' a mortgage
resting upon it, in which case he adopts the mortgage as his own and becomes personally
liable for its payment." BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 120 (6th ed. 1990). The examples in the
regulations appear to indicate that a guarantor will only have to pay the debt if the original
debtor defaults, while a creditor may look directly to the assuming party for payment. Treas.
Reg. § 1.752-2(f), Examples 3, 4 (1991).
123. Treas. Reg. § 1.752-2(b)(3)(iii) (1991).
124. See Treas. Reg. § 1.752-2(b)(3)(ii) (1991) (requiring consideration of obligations
imposed on partners by partnership agreement including deficit restoration provisions).
125. See Treas. Reg. § 1.752-2(f), Examples 1, 2 (1991) (providing partners under obli-
gations to make up deficit capital accounts bear economic risk of loss to that extent).
126. See Treas. Reg. § 1.752-2(b)(3)(i) (1991) (requiring consideration of agreements such
as guarantees, indemnifications, reimbursement agreements, and other obligations binding
partners to make payments to other partners individually or in partnership, or to creditors).
See also Treas. Reg. § 1.752-2(b)(5) (1991) (reducing partner's obligation to make payment
upon constructive liquidation to extent of any reimbursement right one partner holds against
other partners). However, the regulations provide a de minimis exception for partners with 10
percent or less interests in each item of income, gain, loss, etc. that guaranty qualified
nonrecourse financing. Treas. Reg. § 1.752-2(d)(2) (1991).
127. Treas. Reg. § 1.752-2(b)(3)(iii) (1991) (requiring consideration of state law in modi-
fying or creating obligations of partners to make payments to other partners individually or
in partnership, or to creditors).
128. See supra noted 126-27 and accompanying text (requiring determination of ultimate
liability by considering partnership agreement, ex-agreement contracts and state law effects).
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ExAMPLE 14-General partner, G, and limited partner, L, form a
partnership by contributing $100 each. The partnership uses the
$200 and borrows $800 on a recourse note to purchase a storage
building. The partnership agreement provides that G and L will
receive ninety percent and ten percent, respectively, of all profits
and losses. The partnership agreement does not contain a deficit
restoration requirement in order to preserve L's limited liability
status with respect to general claims against the partnership. How-
ever, the bank making the $800 loan requires L to guarantee the
loan. Immediately upon purchase of the storage building, a zero-
sale constructive liquidation would result in a loss of $1,000 to the
partnership, $-0- amount realized minus $1,000 basis for the storage
building. The following table shows the capital account effects of
the ninety and ten percent allocation:
G L Total
Beginning Capital Accounts $100 $100 $200
Loss Allocation (900) (100) (1,000)
Ending Capital Accounts ($800) $-0- ($800)
First, because the partnership agreement does not require the part-
ners to restore deficits in their capital account balances, no partner
bears the economic risk of loss under the level one. 29 Second, L's
guarantee of the note imposes ex-partnership arrangement risk of
loss on L under level two. 30 Third, state law could shift the ultimate
obligation for payment determined under the ex-agreement level of
analysis. If state law: 1) requires G to satisfy a negative capital
account balance even in the absence of a deficit restoration require-
ment, or 2) subrogates the creditor's rights of collection against G
to L after L pays off the loan, G would bear the economic risk of
loss under the regulations.' Alternatively, if state law did not
require deficit restoration or subrogation of the creditor's rights to
L, the regulations would place the economic risk of loss with respect
to the $800 note on L.
132
Consequently, the partners must examine the partnership agreement,
contractual guarantee arrangements and all the possible effects of state law
to determine who would pay off recourse liabilities if the partnership sold
all its unsecured property for zero. 3 3 Thus, while the regulations remain
129. Treas. Reg. § 1.752-2(b)(3)(ii) (1991).
130. Treas. Reg. § 1.752-2(b)(3)(i) (1991).
131. See Treas. Reg. § 1.752-2(0, Examples 3, 4 (1991) (explaining how right of contri-
bution and rights of subrogation affect inter-partner liability allocation).
132. Treas. Reg. § 1.752-2(b)(3)(i) (1991).
133. Treas. Reg. § 1.752-2 (1991).
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true to the economic risk of loss theory, they add significant complexity to
the allocation of recourse liabilities among the partners.
134
C. Nonrecourse Liabilities
After the zero-sale constructive liquidation technique and the three-level
obligations analysis classify certain partnership liabilities as recourse and
allocate them to those partners who bear the economic risk of loss with
respect to those liabilities, the regulations classify the remaining liabilities
as nonrecourse. 3 5 The regulations then require a partnership to allocate its
nonrecourse liabilities in accordance with a three-step system. 36 Under this
134. See supra note 29 and accompanying text (decrying complexity of § 752 regulations).
135. See Treas. Reg. § 1.752-1(a)(2) (1991) (classifying partnership liabilities as nonrecourse
to extent no partner bears economic risk of loss under constructive liquidation). Traditionally,
the treatment of nonrecourse liabilities has been crucial to determining a partner's basis in his
partnership interest. See supra note 20 and accompanying text (explaining Raphan abuse). See
generally, I.R.C. § 752(c) (codifying holding in Crane v. Commissioner 331 U.S. 1 (1947)
and Tufts v. Commissioner, 461 U.S. 300 (1983) by providing that basis of property securing
nonrecours6 debt includes the amount of the nonrecourse debt). See also, United States v.
Kirby Lumber Co., 284 U.S. 1, 3 (1931) (including canceled debt in amount realized because
where no shrinkage of assets occurred); Gerskowitz v. Commissioner, 88 T.C. 984, 1012-14
(1987) (including relief of nonrecourse debt in cancellation of indebtedness income because
basis included debt); Estate of Michael E. Newman, 59 TCM (CCH) 543, 543-44 (1990)
(including relief of nonrecourse debt in cancellation of indebtedness income because basis
included debt), rev'd on other grounds, 934 F.2d 426 (2d Cir. 1991)).
136. Treas. Reg. § 1.752-3(a) (1991). Regulation § 1.752-3(a) provides:
A partner's share of the nonrecourse liabilities of a partnership equals the sum of
paragraphs (a)(1) through (a)(3) of this section as follows-
(1) The partner's share of partnership minimum gain determined in accordance
with the rules under section 704(b) and the regulations thereunder;
(2) The amount of any taxable gain that would be allocated to the partner under
section 704(c) (or in the same manner as section 704(c) in connection with a
revaluation of partnership property) if the partnership disposed of (in a taxable
transaction) all partnership property subject to one or more nonrecourse liabilities
of the partnership in full satisfaction of the liabilities and for no other consideration;
and
(3) The partner's share of excess nonrecourse liabilities (those not allocated under
paragraphs (a)(1) and (a)(2) of this section) of the partnership as determined in
accordance with the partner's share of partnership profits. The partner's interest in
partnership profits is determined by taking into account all the facts and circum-
stances relating to the economic arrangement of the partners. The partnership
agreement may specify the partner's interests in partnership profits for purposes of
allocating excess nonrecourse liabilities provided the interests so specified are rea-
sonably consistent with allocations (that have substantial economic effect under the
section 704(b) regulations) of some other significant item of partnership income or
gain. Alternatively, excess nonrecourse liabilities may be allocated in accordance with
the manner in which it is reasonably expected that the deductions attributable to
those nonrecourse liabilities will be allocated. Excess nonrecourse liabilities are not
required to be allocated under the same method each year.
Treas. Reg. § 1.752-3(a)(1), (2), (3) (1991).
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system, a partner's share of the partnership's nonrecourse debt equals the
sum of. the following three items: The partner's share of partnership
minimum gain; any IRC section 704(c) gain allocable to the partner; and
the partner's share of excess nonrecourse liabilities. 3 7
1. Share of Minimum Gain
First, the regulations allocate. nonrecourse liabilities to a partner to the
extent of his share of partnership minimum gain. 38 A partner's share of
minimum gain generally equals the sum of all past nonrecourse deductions
allocated to the partner. 3 9 The amount of nonrecourse deductions equal an
amount of partnership deductions, usually depreciation on property secured
by the nonrecourse liability, equivalent to the increase in partnership min-
imum gain. 40 Partnership minimum gain, in turn, equals the gain the
partnership would realize if it sold the assets which secure its nonrecourse
debts in satisfaction of such debts.' 4' Generally, minimum gain equals the
excess of the remaining principal balance on a nonrecourse note over the
adjusted tax basis of the secured property. 42 If a partnership finances all
137. Treas. Reg. § 1.752-3(a) (1991).
138. Treas. Reg. § 1.752-3(a)(1) (1991).
139. Preamble to Treas. Reg. § 1.704-2, 56 Fed. Reg. 66981 (1991).
140. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-2(c) (1991). Regulation § 1.704-2(c) states:
The amount of nonrecourse deductions for a partnership taxable year equals the
net increase in partnership minimum gain during the year (determined under para-
graph (d) of this section), reduced (but not below zero) by the aggregate distributions
made during the year of proceeds of a nonrecourse liability that are allocable to an
increase in partnership minimum gain (determined under paragraph (b) of this
section).... However, increases in partnership minimum gain resulting from con-
versions, refinancings, or other changes to a debt instrument (as described in
paragraph (g)(3)) do not generate nonrecourse deductions. Generally, nonrecourse
deductions consist first of certain depreciation or cost recovery deductions and then,
if necessary, by a pro rata portion of other partnership losses, deduction, and section
705(a)(2)(B) expenditures for that year; excess nonrecourse deductions are carried
over.
Id.
141. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-2(d) (1991). Regulation § 1.704-2(d) provides:
. The amount of partnership minimum gain is determined by first computing for
each partnership nonrecourse liability any gain the partnership would realize if it
disposed of the property subject to that liability for no consideration other than full
satisfaction of the liability, and then aggregating the separately computed gains. The
amount of partnership minimum gain includes minimum gain arising from a con-
version, refinancing, or other change to a debt instrument, as described in paragraph
(g)(3) of this section, only to the extent a partner is allocated a share of that
minimum gain. For any partnership taxable year, the net increase or decrease in
partnership minimum gain is determined by comparing the partnership minimum
gain on the last day of the immediately preceding taxable year with the partnership
minimum gain on the last day of the current taxable year.
Id.
142. See id. (providing exact computation of minimum gain which would equal sales price
of remaining principal balance less adjusted tax basis of property).
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of the purchase price of a building with a balloon nonrecourse note, the
difference in the principal of the note and the adjusted basis of the property
will equal the depreciation deductions with respect to the property.' 43 Thus,
as shown in Example 15, infra, a partner's share of minimum gain would
generally equal the prior depreciation deductions allocated to him from the
nonrecourse financed property. 144
2. Share of IRC Section 704(c) Gain
Second, if the amount of partnership nonrecourse liabilities surpasses
the aggregate of partners' shares of minimum gain, the regulations allocate
the surplus liabilities to the partners based on their share of any IRC section
704(c) gain as shown in Example 15, infra. 4 A partner's share of IRC
section 704(c) gain generally equals the unrealized appreciation on property
that he contributed to the partnership at the time of the contribution.'46
3. Share of Excess Nonrecourse Liabilities
Third, if any nonrecourse liabilities remain after assigning them to
partners based on a partner's shares of minimum gain and IRC section
704(c) gain, the regulations allocate the excess nonrecourse liabilities gen-
erally based on the partners' profit percentages. 47 A partner's share of
excess nonrecourse liabilities equals the excess of the total nonrecourse
liabilities of the partnership over the total minimum gain and total IRC
section 704(c) gain multiplied by the partner's percentage in the partnership
profits. 4 The following example illustrates the assignment of nonrecourse
debt under each of the three steps provided by the regulations.
ExAmPLE 15-General partner, G, and limited partner, L, form a
limited partnership by contributing $1,000 cash and $1000 worth of
land, respectively. L had a $950 adjusted basis in the land he
143. See I.R.C. § 168(b)(3)(A) (1988) (describing depreciation deductions for real estate).
144. See Treas. Reg. § 1.704-2(m), Example l(i) (1991) (showing how depreciation deduc-
tions create differences in nonrecourse debt principal and adjusted basis of secured property).
145. Treas. Reg. § 1.752-3(a)(2) (1991).
146. Treas. Reg. § 1.752-3(a)(2) (1991). IRC § 704(c) requires the partnership to track the
excess of the fair market value of property contributed to the partnership over its adjusted
basis. I.R.C. § 704(c) (1988). If the partnership sells the contributed property, IRC § 704(c)
mandates the allocation of the gain, up to the unrealized pre-contribution gain, to the
contributing partner. Id.
147. Treas. Reg. § 1.752-3(a)(3) (1991).
148. Treas. Reg. § 1.752-3(a)(3) (1991). The final regulations, unlike the temporary
regulations, provide that in lieu of allocating in accordance with profit interests, a partnership
may allocate excess nonrecourse liabilities in accordance with the allocation of deductions
attributable to the property securing the nonrecourse debt. Id.; Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.752-
3T(e)(3)(ii) (as amended by T.D. 8274, 1989-2 C.B. 101).
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contributed. The partnership uses the $1,000 to buy adjacent land
and $8,000, borrowed on a ten-year balloon nonrecourse note, to
purchase a storage building. The partnership agreement provides
that G and L will share profits and losses equally. At the end of
Year 1, the partnership deducts $200 in depreciation related to the
building. Thus, the partnership minimum gain would equal $200,
$8,000 face amount of the nonrecourse note minus $7,800 adjusted
basis of the storage building after the $200 depreciation deduction.
G L Total
Share of Minimum Gain $100 $100 $200
Share of § 704(c) Gain -0- 50 50
Share of Excess Liability 3,875 3,875 7,750
Total Share of Liability $3,975 $4,025 $8,000
Because the partnership agreement would allocate fifty percent of
the $200 depreciation deduction to each partner, each receives $100
of minimum gain. 49 The partnership has $50 of IRC section 704(c)
gain because the fair market value of L's land, $1,000, exceeded
its basis, $950, by $50. Thus, the partnership must allocate $50 of
the nonrecourse debt to L. The excess nonrecourse liability equals
$7,750, $8,000 total liability minus $200 previously allocated under
the minimum gain category and $50 previously allocated under the
IRC section 704(c) category." 0 Each partner's profit percentage,
fifty percent, times the excess nonrecourse liability, $7,750 yields a
product of $3,875. Accordingly, G's basis in his partnership interest
increases by a total of $3,975, $100 minimum gain plus $3,875
excess nonrecourse liability, and L's basis increase by $4,025, $100
of minimum gain, $50 of IRC section 704(c) gain and $3,875 of
excess nonrecourse liability."'
As the foregoing examples indicate, the regulations under IRC sections
704(b) and 752 generally produce results consistent with the economic risk
of loss theory. However, the interrelationship of the regulations under IRC
sections 704(b) and 752 may indicate a gap in the application of the economic
risk of loss theory and a failure to reflect of true economic risk of loss.
IV. THmoRY AND APPLICATION
Both the IRC section 704(b) regulations and the IRC section 752
regulations purport to allocate losses and the basis against which those
149. See Treas. Reg. § 1.704-2(g)(1) (1991) (computing minimum gain as difference between
nonrecourse note balance and adjusted basis of property).
150. See Treas. Reg. § 1.752-3(a)(3) (1991) (requiring computation of excess nonrecourse
liabilities).
151. See Treas. Reg.§ 1.752-3(b), Example 1 (1991) (showing how partnerships must
allocate nonrecourse liabilities).
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losses may be deducted to the partners that bear the ultimate economic risk
of loss. 152 Nevertheless, certain problems exist in the application of the
technical rules provided by the regulations. First, the two sets of regulations
approach the economic risk of loss definition from different theoretical
perspectives. The IRC section 704(b) regulations determine economic risk
of loss by using the fair market value of property contributed by a partner
in computing his capital account.' 3 The IRC section 752 regulations, how-
ever, emphasize the ultimate legal obligation of the partners, rather than
the fair market value of contributed property, in determining eqonomic risk
of loss.'-' This theoretical variance can result in loss allocations under IRC
section 704(b) that outpace liability allocations under IRC section 752.155
Second, the zero-sale constructive liquidation technique assumes the worst
possible scenario; the value of all partnership assets falls to zero and the
creditors demand immediate payment." 6 In reality, however, many partner-
ships pay liabilities out of partnership earnings without requiring the partners
to contribute personal assets.'17 Thus, the partners who forego cash distri-
butions so the partnership can make debt service payments bear the true
economic cost of debt repayment, rather than the guarantor partner(s) as
the regulations assume.' 8
A. Potential Mismatch of Loss Allocations and Liability Assignments
When a partnership applies the alternate economic effect test, the
dichotomy between the IRC section 704(b) regulations' value emphasis and
the IRC section 752 regulations' legal obligation emphasis may result in
allocations of losses to partners that do not have the liability generated
basis to deduct the losses: the "valuation trap."' 5 9 The following example
illustrates this apparent gap in the allocation scheme employed by the IRC
section 704(b) and 752 regulations.
ExAMPLE 16-General partner, G, and limited partner, L, form a
limited partnership. G contributes land with a fair market value
and a basis of $100. L contributes an old machine with a fair
152. See supra note 104 and accompanying text (describing basis of regulations as economic
risk of loss).
153. See Treas. Reg. 1.704-1(b)(2)(iv)(b) (as amended in 1988) (increasing partners' capital
accounts by fair market value of contributed property).
154. See Treas. Reg. § 1.752-2(b)(3) (1991) (using ultimate obligations under state law to
determine economic risk of loss).
155. See generally Marich, supra note 81, at 513-28 (denoting added flexibility allocations
based on capital account computed with fair market values rather than with basis of contributed
property).
156. Treas. Reg. § 1.752-2(b)(1) (1991).
157. See Utz, supra note 23, at 709 (expounding that for profitable partnerships, partners
will sacrifice profit shares in order to liquidate partnership liabilities).
158. Id.
159. See supra note 155 and accompanying text (discussing allowance of allocations based
on capital accounts computed with fair market values rather than adjusted bases).
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market value of $100, but a basis of $-0-. The partnership agreement
provides for capital account maintenance and the distribution of
liquidation proceeds in accordance with positive capital account
balances. The partnership agreement does not require the partners
to restore deficit capital account balances, but does contain a
qualified income offset provision. The partnership borrows $1,000
on a recourse note and spends the entire amount on advertising in
the first year of operations. The partnership agreement calls for the
equal allocation of all losses.
G L Total
Beginning Capital Account $100 $100 $200
Initial Allocation (500) (100) $200
Excess Allocation (400) -0- (400)
Ending Capital Accounts ($800) $-0- ($800)
The initial allocation of loss to L will only have alternate economic
effect to the extent that it does not cause a deficit in L's capital
account that reflects the fair market value of the property he
contributed.'1° Unfortunately, L cannot deduct the $100 loss that
the IRC section 704(b) regulations did allocate to him due to the
valuation trap. This result occurs because the IRC section 752
regulations allocate all the debt-generated basis to G on whom state
law places the obligation to repay the loan if the partnership
cannot. 161
The IRC section 752 regulations correctly render the allocation of loss
to L impotent because L does not bear the economic risk of loss with
respect to the liability that generated the deduction. 62 However, the IRC
160. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2)(ii)(d)(3) (as amended in 1988). The regulations would
reallocate the excess losses from L to G under the mock adjusted tax basis technique. See
Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(3)(iii) (as amended in 1988) (describing mock adjusted tax basis
liquidation technique).
161. Treas. Reg. § 1.752-2(b)(3)(iii) (1991).
162. See Treas. Reg. § 1.752-2(a) (1991) (allocating recourse liabilities to partners that
bear economic risk of loss with respect to such liabilities). See also Philadelphia Park
Amusement Co. v. United States, 126 F. Supp. 184 (Ct. CL. 1954) (treating fair market value
of amount received as amount realized in order to correctly measure basis). If L receives $100
of basis for the fair market value of his contribution, he could deduct $100 of loss against it,
bringing his basis back to $-0-. The partnership could then sell the machine and allocate the
gain to L under IRC section 704(c), bringing his basis up to $100. Thus far, L would have
$100 of taxable income that would exactly offset the loss allocation. If L received a distribution
of the $100 of cash from the sale of the machine and his basis dropped back to $-0-, L would
have received $100 of cash in exchange for his investment tax-free due to the incorrect
allocation of loss. The following "T-account" traces the additions and subtractions affecting
L's basis:
L's Basis
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section 704(b) regulations' focus on value in the capital account as the
talisman for loss allocation allows this exercise in futility.' 63 Consequently,
in certain instances, the value-based allocation flexibility of-the IRC section
704(b) regulations can outstrip the ultimate obligation-based liability allo-
cations of the IRC section 752 regulations.
164
B. Risk of Economic Loss or Ultimate Legal Liability
In addition to the above potential mismatching of loss allocations and
basis caused by the IRC section 704(b) regulations, the IRC section 752
regulations assume that the partner who would have to pay off the liability
in a worst case scenario bears the true economic risk of loss. 6 However,
in many instances, a partnership will pay off its liabilities with operating
profits rather than calling upon the partners to restore deficits in capital
account balances or satisfy guarantees.'" Thus, while debt service payments
will generally reduce the profits distributed to all partners, the regulations
only allow the partner who bears the ultimate legal repayment obligation








163. See supra note 162 and accompanying text (explaining how value-based flexibility in
allocations can result in allocations without basis support).
164. Cf. Treas. Reg. § 1.752-2(h) (1991) (providing that partners who pledge separate
assets to secure partnership liabilities bear an economic risk of loss equal to fair market value
of pledged assets). Further, the regulations assign the economic risk of loss to a partner who
contributes specific property solely for the purpose of securing the liability to the extent of
the fair marke value of the property. Treas. Reg. § 1.752-2(h)(2) (1991). The preamble to the
final regulations indicated that the Treasury made the above modification for contributed
property in order to "provide some flexibility in applying the rule [regarding pledged assets]
in situations where allocation are mandated by the provisions of section 704 and the regulations
thereunder." 56 Fed. Reg. 66349 (1991).
165. See supra note 112 and accompanying text (discussing zero-sale constructive liqui-
dation where value of all partnership assets including cash fall to zero).
166. See Wrtus, Er AL. supra note 29, § 62.11 at 62-31 (discussing use of profits to
liquidate partnership liabilities); Utz, supra note 23, at 709 (1990) (indicating that profits pay
off partnership liabilities in many cases). The old IRC § 752 regulation reflected this theory
by providing that all partners share nonrecourse debts based on profit percentages. See supra
note 17 and accompanying text (discussing text of Treas. Reg. § 1.752-1(e) (1956)).
167. See Treas. Reg. § 1.752-2(a) (1991) (allocating recourse liabilities based on economic
risk of loss determined by using zero-sale liquidation technique); This will result even though
state law may define a partner's interest in a partnership to include his interest in profits and
surplus. These profits and surplus will usually produce the cash with which the partnership
will retire the debt. Id.; UNiF. PARl .NE=P AcT § 26, 6 U.L.A. 349 (1914). See also Utz,
supra note 23, at 709 (expounding that for profitable partnerships, partners will sacrifice profit
shares in order to liquidate partnership liabilities).
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The following example shows how the IRC section 752 regulations allocate
a partnership liability to one partner while the other partner's future profits
actually satisfy the liability.
EXAMPLE 17-General partner, G, and limited partner, L, form a
limited partnership and agree to allocate ninety percent of profits
and losses to G, and the balance to L. G contributes a building
worth $1,000,000 with a basis of $-0-. L personally guarantees a
$1,000,000 recourse note for the purchase of a second building. 68
Fire completely destroys the second building which the partnership
did not insure. The partnership manages to pay off the note over
a 10-year period due to an extremely profitable rental agreement
on the first building. Under a zero-sale constructive liquidation, L
would have to pay the note off and thus, the regulations would
increase L's basis in his partnership interest by the entire $1,000,000.
The partnership agreement, however, would allocate ninety percent
of the loss from the destruction of the second building, or $900,000,
to G. Unfortunately, since G cannot include any of the liability in
his basis, he could not deduct any of the loss in the year it occurs.
The regulations produce this result even though the partnership uses
all of its profits over the next ten years, ninety percent of which
would have accrued to G, to pay off the liability. While G does
not bear the legal risk of having to use his personal assets to pay
off the note, he does bear the economic risk of losing his share of
partnership profits for the next ten years.
The regulations focus on the ultimate legal liability to the partners at
the end of each year rather than the profits the partnership will probably
earn in the future. 169 Thus, the regulations sacrifice economic substance for
legally certain form in determining liability allocations. 70 Perhaps the Treas-
168. See Treas. Reg. § 1.752-2(f), Examples 3, 4 (1991) (indicating that L would bear
economic risk of loss and thus, would receive basis assignment).
169. See Treas. Reg. § 1.752-2 (1991) (providing zero-sale constructive liquidation tech-
nique). As the partnership allocated profits to G, in the above example, over the next ten
years, his basis would increase and allow him to deduct a part of the loss. I.R.C. § 705(a)(1)
(1988). In other words, when the partnership allocates the profits to G, G then has a risk to
lose something he owns. Prior to actual accrual of the profits, the regulations apparently deem
G's future interest in potential profits as too tenuous to justify liability-generated basis
allocation. See generally Treas. Reg. § 1.752-2 (1991) (denying recourse liability allocation on
any basis except economic risk of loss). This seems an appropriate general rule because the
liability represents a present claim on the assets of the partnership and the partnership should
allocate this present claim to the partner that would have to pay it off with presently owned
assets.
170. Cf. Treas. Reg. § 1.752-20) (1991) (providing anti-abuse rules for preventing inclusion
of liabilities in basis where allocation has principal purpose of tax avoidance). Regulation
§ 1.752-20) provides:
0)(1) Anti-abuse rules-(1) In general. An obligation of a partner or a related
person to make a payment may be disregarded or treated as an obligation of another
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ury should rename its theory the "Crash and Burn Theory," rather than
the more substantive sounding "Economic Risk of Loss Theory" in order
to more accurately reflect the methodology employed by the regulations.
V. CONCLUSION
In general, the Treasury successfully drafted final regulations under
IRC sections 704(b) and 752 that allocate losses and the liability-generated
basis against which to deduct the losses to the partners that bear the
economic risk with respect to those losses and liabilities.' 7 However, the
regulations do not create complete consistency between the partnership and
other entities. The valuation trap created by the IRC section 704(b) regulations
and the rigid focus on the immediate liquidation by the IRC section 752
regulations highlight areas of contention that either the Treasury can address
person for purposes of this section if facts and circumstances indicate that a principal
purpose of the arrangement between the parties is to eliminate the partner's economic
risk of loss with respect to that obligation or create the appearance of the partner
of related person bearing the economic risk of loss when, in fact, the substance of
the arrangement is otherwise. Circumstances with respect to which a payment may
be disregarded include, but are to limited to, the situations described in paragraphs
()(2) and (j)(3) of this section.
6)(2) Arrangements tantamount to a guarantee. Irrespective of the form of a
contractual obligation, a partner is considered to bear the economic risk of loss with
respect to the partnership liability, or a portion thereof, to the extent that:
(i) The partner or related person undertakes one or more contractual obligations so
that the partnership may obtain a loan;
(ii) The contractual obligations of the partner or related person eliminate substantially
all the risk to the lender that the partnership will not satisfy its obligation under
the loan; and
(iii) One of the principal purposes of using the contractual obligation is to attempt
to permit partners (other than those who are directly or indirectly liable for the
obligation) to include a portion of the loan in the basis of their partnership interests.
The partners are considered to bear the economic risk of loss for the liability in
accordance with relative economic burdens for the liability pursuant to the contractual
obligations. For example, a lease between a partner and a partnership which is not
on commercially reasonable terms may be tantamount to a guarantee by the partner
of a partnership liability.
(3) Plan to circumvent or avoid the obligation. An obligation of a partner to make
a payment is not recognized if the facts and circumstances evidence a plan to
circumvent or avoid the obligation.
Treas. Reg. § 1.752-2(i) (1991). These anti-abuse rules do not encompass, however, the concept
that future profits, even certain profits (e.g., guaranteed long-term lease payments), will
actually pay off the debt. See supra note 169 and accompanying text (discussing use of profits
to liquidate partnership recourse liabilities).
171. See supra notes 33-44 and accompanying text (discussing use of capital accounts to
determine if allocation affects partners' ultimate partnership investments and thus, whether
loss allocations will decrease value of recipient partners' investments); supra notes 106-12 and
accompanying text (discussing incorporation of economic risk of loss theory in IRC § 752
regulations).
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or the taxpayer, courts and congress will face.'7 Meanwhile, the tax practitioner
must struggle to understand the extremely complex and interrelated regulations
in order to determine which partners may receive loss allocations and which
partners may deduct the loss allocations they receive.
Ed R. Haden
172. See supra notes 159-64 and accompanying text (describing valuation trap and emphasis
on worst case scenario liquidation rather than diversion of profits to pay off partnership
liabilities).
